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ABSTRACT

In one generation, development progress has transformed the prospects for humankind, and international cooperation has been a catalyst. Technical assistance for developing countries through two predecessor organizations of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had small beginnings in 1950, and grew to become a multimillion dollar enterprise. This "portrait" shows the evolution of this endeavor over the last 35 years. It looks at how development is changing, and how UNDP is also adapting to new circumstances and needs. Expanding services, a broader resource base, and closer coordination of external assistance are giving UNDP a new look. Also included are four country profiles, illustrating the design, scope, delivery, and national impact of UNDP assistance over the years. These countries are the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Algeria, and Senegal. A complete listing is given of the major components in the participation of over 180 countries and territories (developed and developing) in the program since its inception. The document concludes with an extract from testimony given in May 1985 by a former UNDP/UNESCO international expert to a parliamentary committee in his home country (a major donor to UNDP) about on-the-ground experience in technical cooperation. (JN)

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Portrait of the United Nations Development Programme

1950 – 1985

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GENERATION

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G E N E R A T I O N

Portrait of the

United Nations

Development Programme

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
determined
... To promote social progress and
better standards of life in
larger freedom
... to employ international machinery
for the promotion of the economic and
social advancement of all peoples
have resolved to combine our efforts
to accomplish these aims.

From the United Nations Charter
1945

UNITED NATIONS

1945 – 1985

UNDP

1950 – 1985

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G E N E R A T I O N

IF YOU WERE BORN IN 1950

in the developing world your chances for a healthy, productive life were by age-old standards bleak. On average:

- You could expect to live no more than 43 years—less if you were born in one of the poorest countries. Your chance of dying before the age of five were high—three times greater than today.
- You had one chance in three of going through life literate, one chance in a hundred of attending university. (Some developing countries which became independent in the 1950s and 1960s had no university graduates at all.)
- If you lived long enough, were not afflicted by crippling illness, debilitating malnutrition or lack of basic skills or training, your chances of full-time employment were less than one in two. Even employed, your earnings might have averaged out at 25 cents for a day's labour.
- Your prospects for basic housing, safe drinking water, access to medical care, even a minimal life-sustaining diet were equally meagre.

IF YOU WERE BORN IN 1985

in the developing world, it means vastly improved chances for a productive, enriched, longer and better life. In roughly one generation—35 years—the world has witnessed a dramatic turnaround in human prospects:

- Today average life expectancy in developing countries exceeds 60 years. Child mortality (aged one to four) has been reduced to less than 12 per thousand.
- Adult literacy rates have almost doubled. More than 95 per cent of children now attend primary schools. The number obtaining advanced technical or university training has multiplied 16-fold.
- Diets have improved to the point where average caloric intake equals or exceeds the daily minimal requirement throughout most of the developing world, while gainful employment now occupies 85 per cent of the labour force.

• Despite a doubling of demand through population growth, a larger percentage of people have better housing, clean water and greater access to medical care than ever before in history.

To be sure, progress has been erratic and uneven, and the poorest countries have lagged behind in particular. Even now in many African countries south of the Sahara, the once common spectres of drought and famine have been revived. In a number of developing countries, the crush of external debt has slowed or called a halt to human advancement. And the pace of rural or agrarian improvement has generally failed to match that of industrial and urban progress.

But the record speaks for itself. Since 1950, farm production has grown faster in developing than in developed countries. On a per capita basis, it is 25 per cent higher today. The share of developing countries in world industrial output has jumped from five to more than 20 per cent. They have increased their gross domestic product five-fold, their industrial output ten-fold. They have raised their share of total world exports in manufactured goods to developed countries from three per cent in 1950 to more than 13 per cent today. Indeed, so remarkable has been the overall progress that developing countries have substantially outpaced the economic performance of today's most advanced economies during their formative periods of technological transformation, including even Japan's during its key period of modernization early in this century.

As the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bradford Morse, has pointed out:

"Since the dawn of history, the common lot of most of humankind has been little different from that described by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes in 1651: 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.'



Since 1950, however, even in many of the world's poorest countries, a revolutionary change has taken place. In most parts of the world rampant disease and hunger are being fought vigorously. For much of humankind, illiteracy has been vanquished. There has been a steady improvement in the human condition. The years since 1950 have seen a triumph of human history, due in substantial measure to an unprecedented international co-operative effort."

A New Era

Quietly, without fanfare or even much attention from the world at large, development—the social and economic advancement of two-thirds of humanity—has become the most momentous revolution of our time. It is a revolution in which virtually every nation has taken part, an international co-operative effort in which the United Nations has from the start played a leading role. Despite the doubts and misgivings, *development works*. And it appears to work best in the realm of human resources. As the *World Development Report* (1982) of the World Bank observed: "Long-term improvement in human capital is the one bright spot that is shared by almost all developing countries."

Since the inception of its first systematic attempts at development assistance in 1950, the United Nations system has devoted more attention and resources to the promotion of human skills and potentials than any other external assistance effort. Today the multilateral system born of the United Nations Charter is the world's largest and most broadly based of all development endeavours. Including loans and grants provided by the World Bank/International Development Association and the regional development banks, the system's annual disbursements or expenditures are almost

half those provided bilaterally by all the major donor countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), combined. They are larger than the contribution of any single government, and they amount to a quarter of all development assistance provided by every country in the world. The system has a bigger network of field representation, a larger cadre of experienced development practitioners, a greater reservoir of sectoral and special purpose expertise and a more equitable, need-oriented distribution of its development resources based on countries' comparative needs than any bilateral organization, alone or in combination.

This booklet, coinciding with the 40th anniversary of the United Nations' founding and the 35th anniversary of its main operational activities for development, traces the growth and impact of the centrepiece of that system for technical co-

operation—the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its historic antecedents, the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA, founded in 1950) and the United Nations Special Fund (founded in 1959). Though modest in design and resources from the start (UNDP and its predecessors have never accounted for more than 3 per cent of official development assistance flows), these programmes have had a disproportionately marked influence on the thrust and content of all development assistance over the years, most particularly of human resource development and the building of self-reliant capabilities.

This is the story of that impact and of the results it helped achieve in one short generation of planetary history. Two im-

portant landmarks are honoured by this anniversary publication—the turnabout in the human condition attained with the help of international co-operation; and the growth in collective wisdom and strength which international co-operation has itself achieved.

From a generation born mainly to poverty and despair in 1950, the world has moved to a generation born of greater hope, more opportunity and brighter prospects in 1985. Few stories in human evolution are more promising. None, perhaps, so little appreciated. One single generation has changed the world in a way that all the others could not. Another kind of generation—international co-operation for the generation of skills, knowledge, capabilities and self-help, which is the goal of development—has lit the way.

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In the Beginning

Sir Robert Jackson on the origins of United Nations development assistance

Technical assistance is as old as history. For example, that superb monument, the Taj Mahal, was made possible through human talents drawn from nearly 50 countries. Beyond such very early roots, many of UNDP's 20th century origins are in an organization created in World War II—the Middle East Supply Centre.

In 1940, as military operations began in the Middle Eastern theatre, shipping and port capacity in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf became critical bottlenecks. The military authorities therefore planned a great expansion of ports and inland transport. However, as this would take several years, I advanced an alternative policy: to make the area involved—from Turkey to South Africa and from Cyrenaica to India, with a population of about 100 million—as self-sufficient as possible in essential agricultural commodities and industrial output as quickly as possible, and thus reduce civilian imports to a minimum. This became the basic objective of the new Middle East Supply Centre.

In the goal of self-sufficiency this naturally involved every aspect of every economy in the region—agriculture, industry, health, infrastructure, education, science, etc.—and the establishment of a watertight import licensing system. Schemes to achieve greater productivity and import substitution became the order of the day. To these ends, and great ingenuity was shown not only by the staff of the Centre, but also by officials in local government institutions and private companies. The Centre's Headquarters in Cairo had a relatively small staff (250), and offices in the countries concerned had up to 3,000 employees altogether. Centre operations were dramatically successful. Within 15 months, 90 per cent of the civilian imports which previously had occupied 90 per cent of the total port capacity of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf had been replaced by local

production. As a result, the flow of military supplies to the Allied Armed Forces in the Western Desert was vastly increased, and also to the USSR via the Persian Gulf. These results naturally aroused much interest in Washington, London and elsewhere.

Organizationally, there is no doubt the success of MESC inspired, in due course, the establishment of the Regional Economic Commissions in the United Nations and the regional groupings within the World Health Organization.

As to technical assistance, several officials from MESC accompanied me when I was appointed late in 1944 as Chief Executive Officer (under the Director-General) of the first of the modern UN organizations—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Naturally, we applied the same principles of self-sufficiency to the devastated countries we assisted as the war came to an end. Technical assistance was once more provided in virtually every sector.

As UNRRA came to an end in 1947-48, many of its staff transferred to the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Others went to UNICEF and the International Refugee Organization (later the UN high Commissioner for Refugees—UNCHR), both of which were established to continue UNRRA's functions in those fields (other functions having been transferred to relevant specialized agencies.) This transfer of personnel meant that the intellectual seeds of technical assistance were sown throughout the United Nations system very early in its existence.

In the United Nations, the initiative to undertake technical assistance was greatly assisted by these officials and by Charles Malik of Lebanon, who had worked closely with MESC and was an early President of the Economic and Social Council, and by David Owen (the head of the UN EPTA), who had observed the Centre's work very closely from Whitehall during the war. EPTA was very modest ($2 million expended in its first year of operation), but it was invaluable in nourishing those seeds of technical assistance already sown in the UN system.

Sir Robert Jackson has held many senior appointments in the United Nations system since 1944, and is now Senior Adviser to the Secretary-General.

TESTING GROUND

"These (UN Charter) ideas perhaps find their most concrete expression and application in the work of Technical Assistance, in all its forms; out of these ideas a structure has arisen that speaks to the imagination of the peoples. It is not based on national egoism, but on international solidarity and at present it is the greatest single real contribution to the diminution of tension in the world and therefore to peace and security."

Representative of the Netherlands, 1953

"...The concept of mutual aid and enlightened self-help which is the basis of all these programmes...is one of the most fruitful and significant developments in international affairs since the Second World War."

Representative of Canada, 1953

It began with what was called technical assistance. Citing the lack of expert personnel and technical organization in underdeveloped areas, the General Assembly on 4 December 1948 authorized funds to enable the Secretary-General to organize international teams of experts through the United Nations or its specialized agencies to advise governments on economic development; to assist in training experts and technicians both abroad and in the developing countries themselves; and to assist governments in obtaining technical personnel, equipment and supplies and in organizing their development efforts, including the exchange of information on common problems (Resolution 200).

Such technical assistance ideas were increasingly "in the air." (Six weeks later, on 20 January 1949, U.S. President Harry S. Truman would propose his "Point Four" programme of technical assistance, in part to be implemented through United Nations channels.) The United Nations itself had raised the issue in resolutions adopted as early as December 1946, in March and August 1947 and again in August 1948. Moreover, the Charter of the United Nations itself had set the objective: "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character;" and to promote "higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development."

As with any great enterprise, and despite these impressive objectives and commitments, some would contend even now that the world was seeking from the start to accomplish development "on the cheap." The amounts envisioned for this technical assistance toward the development of two-thirds of humankind were approximately 1/500th of the aid provided under the U.S. Marshall Plan for European economic recovery from the Second World War.

In retrospect, however, the instincts of the international development community may have been correct. The Marshall Plan sought in part to rebuild the capital base of a war-torn Europe which already possessed the human resources required to make such inputs effective. It was rightly perceived that, by contrast, developing countries needed to generate precisely these human skills—a principal purpose of technical assistance—before capital inputs could similarly make their mark.

To this day, it may be said, the international development community has yet to resolve the issue of appropriate balance between human and capital inputs in the development process. The Marshall Plan, while successful, proved a misleading model, as the development effort in the Third World increasingly shifted toward capital assistance to the neglect of the kind of technical co-operation given emphasis at the start.

1949 meeting of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which led to the creation of EPTA.

"The United Nations and the specialized agencies have an unparalleled opportunity to assist underdeveloped countries to take advantage of modern techniques, and so to help them to achieve for themselves the material and social benefits of sound, balanced economic development."

The Secretary-General, 1949

* A tradition of prosaic titles was also bequeathed to United Nations operational activities for development in these early years. The blandly named Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was later joined by its pre-investment counterpart, called simply the United Nations Special Fund, in 1959. In 1965 these two organizations were merged to form the United Nations Development Programme.

Principles

While the resources foreseen to help transfer these skills and knowledge were initially scant, the United Nations understood very well and very early the key operating principles that would guide its development activities over the succeeding years. A 328-page report, *Technical Assistance for Economic Development*, was issued in May 1949 in response to General Assembly Resolution 200, and laid down four basic guidelines:

Self-determination

"Development in each country must grow out of that country's particular needs, desires and potentialities. It is impossible to transfer a given pattern of development intact from one area to another".

Self-reliance

"The proposed technical assistance activities are intended to help the underdeveloped countries to help themselves... This purpose cannot be achieved unless the countries concerned are willing themselves to take vigorous action to establish the internal conditions upon which sound development depends".

Neutrality and respect for sovereignty

"It is essential that the persons chosen to advise or assist underdeveloped countries be wholly disinterested and that they should, in addition to their technical qualifications, have an understanding of the basic problems which face the countries in which they serve".

Long-term commitment

"Progress in economic development must be measured in decades rather than years. The technical assistance projects described in this report are merely a beginning and some of these will take years to complete".

These sound and now well tested principles continue very much to guide UNDP to this day and remain some of the key, differentiating characteristics of the Programme's work.

The proposals set out in the initial technical assistance report in 1949 were considered at length that summer by the Economic and Social Council. In Geneva on 15 August the Council adopted resolution 222, which established:

- the "Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries," which became known as EPTA*
- an inter-agency supervising body called the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) and composed of the executive heads (or their representatives) of the United Nations and the agencies. Its main task was to act as a central co-ordinating body for the assistance, with agencies carrying out projects according to their fields of specialized competence.
- an intergovernmental policy group, the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), which was a standing body of the Economic and Social Council and comprised all its members. TAC would examine and approve each year's programme.

David Owen (left), who became the head of EPTA, at 1949 ECOSOC meeting.

The enterprise being new, much of an organizational nature in resolution 222 was left to be worked out or was put vaguely. But the guiding policies and operating principles were set forth unequivocally and in more detail than the May 1949 technical assistance report. From the start they stressed the sovereignty, independence and self-reliance of the developing countries as Programme participants (see box). While these principles continue to govern UNDP today, practical operational modes nonetheless remained to be ironed out.

Founding Policies

The Economic and Social Council created the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) in 1949 and laid down its basic policies as follows:

United Nations help to developing countries would:

- be rendered only in agreement with the governments concerned and on their request;
- not be a means of foreign economic interference nor be accompanied by any considerations of a political nature, and would avoid distinctions arising from the political structure of a country or the race or creed of its population;
- be designed to meet the specific needs of the country, be decided by the government and be provided as far as possible in the form it desires.

Requesting governments would make specific commitments to:

- define in advance and facilitate the activities requested by helping the Programme understand the problems for which assistance is asked;
- devise or maintain adequate governmental co-ordination machinery for the assistance received;
- give full and prompt consideration to the technical advice received;
- assume responsibility for a substantial part of the costs of technical assistance, at least those costs payable in their own currencies;
- sustain projects initiated at their own request;
- inform participating organizations of the assistance requested and make available information on the results to be shared by other countries and international organizations.

Participating organizations of the Programme were enjoined to co-ordinate their assistance so it would:

- be suitable for integration in their normal substantive activities;
- be handled jointly by them when coming within the sphere of two or more agencies;
- have due regard for their constitutions and established inter-agency relations.

Practicalities

The Technical Assistance Board* held its first formal meeting on 23 and 24 February 1950, chaired by David Owen, then United Nations Assistant Secretary-General in charge of economic affairs. A formative figure in EPTA's establishment, he would go on to shape EPTA's operational policies as its sole director until 1965.

Not surprisingly, the TAB in its first few meetings plunged into those administrative requirements which had been left largely to the imagination in resolution 222. It settled on the manner of conducting its business and on arrangements for its Executive Secretary (Owen) and his staff. It sought to set common salary policies and standard conditions of employment for the experts to be engaged. And it worked to fix terms of the basic agreements to be negotiated with recipient countries, among other things committing them to contributions in local costs and supporting services.

These agreements set an important benchmark for the Programme, which remains valid to this day. Assistance from UNDP and its predecessors comes on grant terms, but recipient governments must make counterpart allocations from their domestic budgets to meet such project needs as local infrastructure, salaries of national personnel, recurrent expenditures, etc.—frequently exceeding in cash or kind the value of UNDP's own input. This means that developing countries have a substantial financial stake in the success or failure of the projects involved and would thus be reluctant to undertake "projects for the sake of projects."

Another important step in EPTA's early months was the establishment of the field office network—an on-site, professionally staffed set of development service centres, with offices located within each of the developing countries, providing a focal point for continuous dialogue and exchange of information on development needs. The network—eventually to become a world-wide service based in 115 developing countries and territories and covering programmes in over 150—grew out of practical necessity.

Even before EPTA's creation, the United Nations family had experimented in the appointment, by the Secretary-General, of technical

* Initially, six organizations were represented on the TAB: the United Nations itself, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were accorded participation.

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To the Skies: ICAO and UNDP

The first EPTA-financed civil aviation training project carried out by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was set up in Iran in 1951, followed by assistance to Indonesia, Egypt and Ethiopia in 1952. In 1953 the training centre in Mexico City opened its doors to Spanish-speaking students from the region. Since that time, some 15 regional institutions have been opened, offering training at an advanced level in a wide range of aeronautical disciplines. In addition, many more countries have been helped to set up their own schools to give basic training, where numbers warrant.

Supplementing these training programmes, some 15,000 fellowships have been awarded, the majority being hosted by the regional schools. In the Asia/Pacific region alone, the four regional schools set up at Curug in Indonesia, Singapore, Bangkok and Manila graduated 1,300 trainees in the years 1978-84.

The impact of this training programme may be seen in the statistics of aviation activity:

- In the 1950s there was a three-fold expansion measured in tonne-kilometres performed by airlines of the world. The rate of growth was slightly higher in North America, which then accounted for over 60 per cent of the activity.
- In the 1960s and 1970s, the growth rate in the Asia/Pacific, Latin American, African and West Asian regions overtook that of North America.
- By 1981, these regions, which include almost all of the world's developing countries, had increased their share of world aviation activity from the 20 per cent held in 1950 to 32 per cent.

Airlines of the developing regions performed 46 times more tonne-kilometres in 1981 than in 1951 — 37,798 million compared to 819 million. This rapid expansion could not have taken place without the support of radically increased numbers of trained personnel. By contrast, in North America, activity increased only 18.8 times — from 2,681 million to 50,306 million tonne-kilometres.

While training and the development of training facilities are at the very heart of the UNDP/ICAO technical assistance programme, other kinds of assistance have also been provided. The co-ordinated United Nations effort beginning in 1969 under the Fund for the Development of West Irian (FUNDWI) and administered by UNDP, included an ICAO programme of airfield and airline development. By 1974, an integrated network of air services had been created which continue to meet the communication needs of these remote territories of Indonesia.

In 1973 a project was launched in Brazil to develop an infrastructure for certification of airworthiness compliance. This has enabled the country to develop its own aircraft design and manufacturing capability to meet the most exacting international standards.

The development of airfields — major lifelines for landlocked countries — is receiving UNDP/ICAO support in Botswana, Chad, Lesotho, Swaziland and Uganda, and projects are active in over 90 countries enabling the civil aviation sector to serve wider development needs.

BUILDING BASIC FOUNDATIONS

A sample of actions over the years by six original member agencies in the Programme to build up basic knowledge and services needed by developing countries

Purpose	Projects	Number of Countries	UNDP Inputs (US$ million)	Agency
Survey and development of energy resources	266	88	464	UN
Assess soil types and capabilities	133	70	101	FAO
Promote primary education and functional literacy	187	76	128	UNESCO
Develop comprehensive health services	509	129	115	WHO
Expand air traffic control services	211	98	192	ICAO
Strengthen labour administration	93	51	26	ILO

"...In Pakistan we appreciate this assistance not only because it has become a cornerstone in our programme of economic development, but also because it comes from a source which is not only international but very human and universal in character..."

Representative of Pakistan, 1953

assistance representatives to act as intermediaries for a variety of assistance needs, always with the concurrence of the government and the organizations involved. The TAB similarly decided at its second meeting to apply this technique, also on an experimental basis, in Pakistan, since a single officer seemed essential to the scope and wide-ranging nature of that country's technical requests. At the same time it was agreed that, if in the future one or more organizations of the United Nations system should feel the need for a representative in a particular country, no appointment would be made until the TAB had been informed, so that as many members as possible might associate themselves with the appointment. Thus the development service network of field offices was born—eventually to become a centrepiece for the development efforts, not only of the United Nations system in its entirety, but of efforts made by many bilateral and non-governmental development assistance agencies as well.

Difficulties

Beginnings traditionally generate excitement and enthusiasm, but are not without their problems. For EPTA, the start of operational activities was held up for six months because the conference at which governments were to pledge their initial contributions was delayed. Finally on 12 June 1950 at Lake Success, New York, a grand total of $20 million was pledged.

In these early years the voluntary nature of the Programme was firmly stamped out. Governments were to give voluntarily to its support and receive voluntarily of its benefits. But the discretionary nature of year-to-year contributions, in good times and bad; the pledging and payment of contributions in non-convertible currencies; the absence of a clear resource target or a means of achieving it led in succeeding years to difficult financial—and hence managerial—problems. Its financial base of support was always voluntary and thus sometimes volatile.

Because the United States was and for 35

years would remain the largest single donor and because the U.S. dollar was the prime currency of international trade and investment, the Programme's currency of account became and remained the dollar. Actual contributions from all sources ebbed and flowed in a variety of currencies, convertible and non-convertible alike. The fluctuations have been such that, over the years, resource issues and their impact on Programme management have been a repeated focus of debate in the policy deliberations of governing bodies.

But little is accomplished without controversy, and there were other problems that also lingered. EPTA had been established in part to bring more coherence and co-ordination to a development effort which was at best piecemeal. But many of the specialized agencies which carried out the assistance had been in existence for some years.* Some had already garnered experience of their own in technical assistance. They were understandably determined to press for assistance in their own areas of expertise, for they knew well the woeful dimension of the needs, and though their view was sectoral their substantive knowledge and experience were unparalleled.

And, indeed, in sectoral terms the six original member agencies of the TAB helped greatly over the years to lay basic foundations in their respective fields of competence for the great majority of developing and newly emerging countries. (For examples, see chart on "Building Basic Foundations".)

For all these substantial contributions in laying some basic foundations for development in so many countries, the quest for a co-ordinated, integrated and multisectoral approach continued to be elusive. The idea that EPTA could draw together the sectoral strings into a harmonious whole, could engineer broad technical programmes of integrated river basin development or comprehensive rural development—both highly prized objectives even in the early years—ran up against conflicting perspectives of where the real emphasis should lie. Even in the field, agencies sometimes tended to view EPTA country representatives as overpaid administrative officers, lacking in substantive knowledge, who met experts at the airport and arranged lodging and transportation for their stay. Many resident representatives, on the other hand, took seriously their role as development administrators in the broadest sense, and clashes were inevitable.

To be sure, the creative tension produced by different perspectives and fiercely defended sectoral prerogatives had its positive effects. But the strongly felt need for a more coherent and comprehensive approach remained a key issue, underscored by increasingly emphatic resolutions and reorganizations set down by the General Assembly over the years.

On the government side one problem was that EPTA operated largely through foreign affairs ministries. In the early years, many developing country governments were reluctant to confer even the title "Resident Representative" on the EPTA appointee, cautiously preferring "Representative" instead. But the main difficulty was that foreign offices were by nature more attuned to what was happening outside their countries than to their own countries' complex development needs and efforts. Development activities were either dispersed in a plethora of sectoral ministries or centred in a ministry of finance or a central bank. The resident representatives had, by dint of perseverance, to forge links and working contacts with these as best they could. The skill and determination of many of the Programme's early resident representatives—and their sheer imagination and inventiveness in response to needs arising spontaneously—contributed greatly to the astonishing evolution of field offices into development service centres of major importance. In a sense, early field offices were experimental stations operating with few people, few formal rules and fewer still conceptions of what their actual role might be. The more creative and dedicated representatives established the precedents which made their roles more effective, and the lessons were ultimately institutionalized into the network as a whole (see box, "The Field Office and How it Grew").

Finally, there was what might be called the problem of idealism and innocence. Although the framers of EPTA were acutely aware of the long-term nature of human resource development, there was abroad in the land the idea that technical assistance was an inexpensive means of assisting and uplifting the world's poor. A few skills imparted, some techniques transferred, key people trained, some basic equipment provided and the developing countries would

"We envisage the Programme as a dynamic pilot enterprise which moves in various directions to achieve the greatest coherence and efficiency."

Representative of Iraq, 1953

"...The Programme has been in many ways a model of what an ideal United Nations programme should be. It is creative, it respects the sovereignty of member states, it is truly co-operative with all recipients giving as much or more than they receive. It is of benefit to all participants. It carries the United Nations forward in its Charter pledge to foster higher standards of life in larger freedoms."

Representative of the United States, 1953

* ILO, for example, was established in 1919, while FAO, UNESCO, ICAO and WHO were established in 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948, respectively. The two oldest executing agencies of the United Nations development system are the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), founded in 1865, and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), founded in 1874.

move in unison into the thriving tumult of the world industrial economy.

If only! The fact is that much had to be learned, and painfully, about the nature of development in these early years—and that much, needless to say, still remains to be learned. As one long-time UNDP staff member who recalled the start of EPTA put it: "In those early days everybody assumed that most of what we would be doing would be integrated rural development and other high profile projects which would bring quick and big results. These were the projects that everybody looked at and they reflected our idealism and innocence because many of them in the end did not work. We are still learning lessons and struggling to understand the real nature, for example, of grassroots development. We put in our external inputs, and it looked beautiful and we thought this is going to make a big difference for these people. But the minute you stopped providing the external inputs the thing collapsed, and we were right back to where we started two or three years before." The need for a sustaining infrastructure, for a higher level of self-reliance and for an integrated, multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach continued to demand attention.

By the end of 1951 the Expanded Programme had taken substantial form. It had obligated almost $6.5 million for projects in 71 countries. It had recorded more than $20 million in pledged contributions from 54 countries. And it had awarded 800 fellowships for specialized study abroad and fielded 797 project experts recruited from 65 different countries, together with training and demonstration equipment. The Programme's governing body, the Technical Advisory Committee, could justly note "with satisfaction that the groundwork of the Programme has been laid."

1952 brought a year of marked growth and vitality, with the number of experts (1,626) and the number of fellowships (2,127) more than doubled. Twenty-six new countries and territories received assistance and 11 more countries joined the 54 original contributors for total pledges of $18.8 million. Two additional executing agencies, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), also joined the TAB. The system of Resident Representatives (19 were in place by the end of 1952) was formally adopted by the TAB to help governments plan and implement their projects, to harmonize EPTA activities and to provide administrative support and advice to experts in the field.

This rapid pace of expansion slowed somewhat in 1953 and 1954, as the volume of requests for assistance rose but contributions pledged fell short of expectations. By 1955 the pace of expansion had resumed, however, and that year also marked another important milestone in Programme development.

The First "Country Programming"

The allocation of EPTA's resources had been a keenly debated issue among participating organizations from the time of its founding. It was finally decided to award the agencies fixed shares based on the existing volume of their own technical assistance activities. Thus the share of FAO was 29 per cent, the United Nations 23 per cent, WHO 22 per cent, UNESCO 14 per cent, ILO 11 per cent and ICAO one per cent, with a small balance to be allocated according to developing country needs. But as requests for

assistance rapidly began to outstrip available resources, a more rational setting of priorities seemed increasingly in order.

In 1953 the intergovernmental Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) established a working party to review the system of allocations and other financial procedures, and its discussion centred on what were known as "the French proposals." The Government of France argued that when available funds were distributed by organization, rather than in accord with recipient needs and preferences, a rational programme of development priorities could be set only by rare coincidence. The time had come for a new policy based on the priorities as seen by developing country governments themselves.

Though sharply contended, the principle was accepted in resolutions of ESOCOC and the General Assembly in 1954. Beginning in 1955 TAB was required to formulate target figures early in each year as a guide to planning country and regional programmes. Programmes would be drawn up by the governments themselves at the country level in consultation with the Resident Representative and with the advice of the participating organizations. Governments would then forward their requested programmes through the resident representative to the TAB, indicating the priorities they attached to projects within the package. The TAB would then draw up the overall programme for the following year and submit it for discussion and approval by the TAC. A contingency fund of five per cent of available resources would be set aside for the Executive Chairman to meet emergencies and ensure flexibility.

The adoption of country programming only five years after EPTA's founding marked a watershed in the evolution of the development process as a whole. It signalled a new recognition of the integrated nature of that process. It gave force to the idea that governments of developing countries knew better than any outsider the priorities required for national advancement. It placed responsibility for the setting of these priorities on the governments themselves. In the process it strengthened their planning and co-ordinating capabilities, encouraging the kind of self-reliance which was eventually to become the be-all and end-all of technical co-operation itself.

By now EPTA was moving from strength to strength. Seventy-seven governments pledged $28.8 million in new money for 1956. Programmes for 103 countries and territories committed $34 million in the year, providing the services of 2,346 experts and 2,128 fellowships for specialized study abroad.

An evaluation of EPTA assistance to 30 countries representing 60 per cent of total country programmes for 1956 showed that all had established some kind of development planning and co-ordinating machinery, though most still lacked properly formulated development plans. Almost half the countries studied had difficulty in furnishing national staff to work with EPTA experts. Nonetheless, of 710 projects carried out, 71 per cent were judged satisfactory to excellent in results and only 7 per cent fell below expectation; assessment was judged premature for the remaining projects. Specific results also looked good (see box on page 22).

"...It would be a real shame and an irreparable loss if an international undertaking of such worthwhile a nature and carried out amidst so many difficulties should disappear because of a financial crisis."

Representative of Ecuador, 1953

"May I say, as one who has had some share in this great enterprise since it was no more than a daydream in a few adventurous minds, that... its greatest merit may be seen by future historians to lie in its demonstration that international co-operation for economic development is a practical working proposition, and that it proved that some dreams can come true."

David Owen, first head of EPTA, 1959

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The Field Office and How it Grew

Margaret Joan Anstee remembers

Everything, it seemed, was improvised that day in July 1952 when I first began to work for the UN Technical Assistance Board in Manila. The office was housed in a disused surgery in the grounds of the Philippine General Hospital, a dilapidated building with a leaking roof. In the rainy season every room was festooned with tin cans and any other receptacles that could be found to catch the drips...

Yet there was a tremendous feeling of enthusiasm and pioneering at that time. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance had begun in the Philippines only a few months before I arrived and the first experts were starting to come in. There were, I suppose, around a dozen of them—"specialists" we used to call them in those far-off days. The Government's needs and priorities had been decided in rather an ad-hoc way—"planning" was not a fashionable word among the developing countries at that time. Administrative procedures were complicated and often had to be worked out on the spot in order to deal with some unforeseen situation. Both Headquarters and country offices operated on a shoestring, and the latter were inevitably left a good deal of leeway to work out their own problems as they saw fit. It was an experimental programme and innovation was in the air.

While those times were enormously exciting, I do not know how many of us working on the Programme at the country level saw clearly what tremendous possibilities the Programme contained. I know that if I, for one, had been told then that in ten years' time or less I should, after having worked in Colombia and Uruguay, hold the high-sounding title of Resident Representative and Director of Special Fund Programmes in Bolivia, with responsibility for a team of some 60 experts, and a programme spending over a million dollars a year, I might



have found the prospect pleasing, but I would certainly not have been very confident that it would become a reality. Yet that is just what has happened and the transformation has not ended there. As the size of the individual programmes has grown, so, logically, have the headquarters and field staff required to run them. Programming has been developed to a fine art, which attempts to anticipate long-term as well as immediate needs. And administrative procedures, while they have had to embrace ever increasing operational complexities, have nonetheless become systematized and institutionalized.

Another important element in the history of United Nations technical assistance since its inception has been the tremendous will to development on the part of peoples all over the world. In this I am not referring only to the official policies of the governments, necessary as they are, but to the determination of the underprivileged and undernourished, and often illiterate, to win a better standard of living for themselves by adding their own efforts to the co-operation received from outside. Without this determination none of this assistance could come near achieving its goal. As I look back, so many examples of this come to mind: a previously illiterate youth proudly and laboriously scratching out his name in an evening school in the Guajira desert in Colombia; or the Uruguayan gaucho who got up at a village meeting, called to discuss whether a community education project should be discontinued, who exclaimed "But that would be like cutting off one of our wings"...

I personally am convinced that international programmes of co-operation have their own contribution to make to world peace—possibly more indirect and certainly longer-term than, say, the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Yet the people who fight on this front against world poverty, disease and ignorance—the second-line soldiers, if you will—are all too often forgotten and their achievements unsung, despite the sacrifices that many of them are called upon to make. I have only to think of a group of young Colombian teachers working in abysmal conditions in the Guajira desert in 1957; of a team of experts staying long months in the Amazon jungles to carry out a forest inventory; or of the Bolivian head of a Rural Development Centre, living isolated amid the barren lunar landscape of the altiplano—surely one of the most desolate in the world—to know that this is true.

At times the work can even be dangerous: in two countries to which I have been assigned the experts have on occasion had to continue their work in the midst of armed revolutions...Neither am I likely to forget the period in 1963 when there were a series of accidents causing six deaths in as many months on our Bolivian mission, five of expatriate staff and one Bolivian...Another of my most poignant and haunting memories is the sight of the bodies of three Swedish

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fliers and technicians, who had been engaged on aerial geophysical work in a mineral survey, being brought down at a jog trot from the place high in the Andes where they met their death, by relays of Indians clad in rough homespuns and red cummerbunds whose vivid colour belied the tragedy of the occasion...

As I try to sum up my impressions of this period in my own mind, the most significant one of all is that, whereas I have tried to make my own modest contribution, I have in fact learned very much more than I have taught, not only about development problems as such, but about the whole intricate pattern of human life and problems all over the globe, and the basic similarity of human needs, sentiments and aspirations, irrespective of race, colour, creed or social standing.

Two things of which I am firmly convinced are:

First, we must not become so mesmerized by the tempting magic of facts and figures—GNP, national income per capita and the rest—as to forget the human individual whose welfare is the ultimate goal of our endeavour.

Second, to be successful in a programme of this kind one must be constantly in touch with everyday reality and the life of the people of the country one is called upon to serve. Not only are some of my richest and happiest memories of occasions spent in remote areas, often in acute discomfort, but these experiences have been of inestimable value to me in helping to understand the problems we are called upon to help to solve.

Margaret Joan Anstee is currently Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy to the Under Secretary-General, United Nations Department of Technical Co-operation for Development. These are excerpts from observations she wrote 20 years ago, on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of EPTA.



First Five Years: EPTA Results

- Fifty oil-well sites had been located in Iran by a United Nations team.
- Asia's first penicillin factory had been established in India with the help of WHO.
- On FAO advice, farmers in Thailand were growing pineapples for export as a year-round crop.
- In the then Kingdom of Libya, the first glimmerings of oil riches were being confirmed through United Nations-supported surveys.

Toward the United Nations Special Fund

Demand for assistance was now greatly outstripping available funding. Pausing to take "A Forward Look"* at the Programme's future direction, TAB saw that EPTA's work was proving useful. But it was barely scratching the surface of urgent and widespread developing country needs. Poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy remained the common lot.

One course TAB considered was to continue modestly to expand EPTA's established work and resources toward a new target goal of $50 million a year in contributions. A second, more challenging course would be to tackle dire needs over a whole range of critical activities—perhaps even by creating a parallel funding agency—with considerably expanded resources committed over a longer period of time.

This second course would involve more systematic and detailed surveys of basic resources; the development of education and training services of all kinds and at every level, including universities and teacher training institutes; building up research facilities designed to improve production; demonstration projects in agriculture, livestock farming, forest production and fisheries; the development of institutes and centres of fundamental scientific research; creation and expansion of housing and construction capabilities; the control of debilitating diseases; and training in public and fiscal management and administration. Such were the critical areas of interrelated need pointed to by initial country programming exercises.

It was clear that the "Forward Look" report favoured the more ambitious second course. Not only did the needs point that way; the international debate on aid had moved in a receptive direction. And it was clear that no expansion of technical assistance alone could wage a decisive attack on development needs which increasingly embraced not only multiple substantive sectors but also such wider issues as trade and capital investment requirements.

The far-reaching possibility of a United Nations fund for capital development had been a major issue of contention in the General Assembly. The compromise formula eventually agreed upon, however, excluded the creation of another capital development fund, in part out of deference to efforts in that direction being undertaken by the World Bank. Instead, in December 1957 the General Assembly, citing EPTA as an instrument "of proven effectiveness in promoting the economic development of less developed countries," decided to establish a new special fund. Its purpose would be to provide systematic and sustained assistance in fields essential to integrated technical, economic and

* The title of a special report prepared for the TAC document (E/2885).

social development. In particular, "it would facilitate new capital investments of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating conditions which would make such investments either feasible or more effective." (Resolution 1219 (XII)).

Thus was born the pre-investment work of United Nations Special Fund, which began its operational activities in 1959 and served as a close-working complement to EPTA until the merger of the two funds in 1965. Basically, the Special Fund, with roughly double the volume of contributions of EPTA, was able to undertake larger-scale, longer-term projects. While early EPTA projects averaged $50,000 or so in cost, for example, Special Fund projects averaged almost $1 million—the kind of expenditure required to finance extensive surveys and feasibility studies leading to larger-scale investment follow-up. And while EPTA concentrated on expert services and particularly training fellowships, the Special Fund allocated less than five per cent of project costs to fellowships for study abroad and made a far more extensive provision of specialized equipment—again, often required by the size and complexity of its endeavours.

In terms of broad principles and operating procedures the two organizations had much in common. Resident Representatives donned a second Special Fund hat to go with the additional source of development funding for which they became responsible. The Special Fund also had a dynamic and highly respected leader in the person of Paul Hoffman, a well-known U.S. industrialist and former administrator of Marshall Plan aid. "Production and productivity in the low-income countries cannot be raised without substantial investment," Hoffman said. "But investment—public or private—will not venture into the unknown." The job of the Special Fund was to help prepare for that investment, to lay the effective groundwork for it.

As Hoffman stressed, "United Nations assistance is scrupulously impartial, most acceptable to recipient countries and above any accusation of seeking a political or commercial advantage for another country or particular group of countries." This concept of politically neutral aid—of aid without strings—drew inspiration from the founding precepts of EPTA and, as practiced, became a major contribution to effective development co-operation.

Like EPTA, the Special Fund also took off with speed. In its first five years it fielded more than 1,500 experts; worked with more than 17,000 national project staff (over a third at the technical and senior staff levels); and trained 56,000 people under 124 projects at advanced educational and technical levels. It carried out 31 national and physical resource surveys, established two applied research institutes and completed two long-term training projects. Some $800 million in follow-up investments had been generated by its feasibility studies.

Like EPTA, the Special Fund compiled a record of specific and concrete results (see box) and its successes seemed limited only by the resources available to finance them, though like EPTA it knew its share of setbacks and mistakes.

First Five Years: Special Fund Results

- In Guatemala the Special Fund developed a 15-year programme for hydropower installations through World Bank studies.
- In Thailand it paved the way under a United Nations-executed project for the $22.5 million multi-purpose dam on the Nam Pong river, a Mekong tributary.
- In Egypt it financed FAO work on soil surveys and irrigation and land reclamation studies which helped open more than a million acres to new cultivation.
- In Nigeria the foundations for a rapid expansion of secondary schools were laid through UNESCO help in establishing a Federal College for teacher training in Lagos and four regional teacher training colleges.

"...We recognize that assistance received under the United Nations Programme has something new and hopeful added to it: the miraculous ingredient of international co-operation whereby nations, by pooling together a portion of their resources and their "know-how", are able to help each other without hope of reward or profit or gain. We have the fervent hope that this programme will expand and endure and continue to grow from strength to strength."

Representative of the Philippines, 1953

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The Locusts and the Maize

Perhaps it was inevitable that the world's first universal programme of technical co-operation sooner or later would operate projects of interregional and global scale to tackle development problems that transcend national borders and even continental limits. What could not so readily be foreseen is that dozens of countries and hundreds of specialists have successfully marshalled both brawn and brains from many backgrounds, nationalities and disciplines and have actually solved many such problems.

Here is a glimpse of results achieved by two of the earliest intercontinental programmes begun by UNDP's predecessors.

Winged enemy

A cloud of desert locusts could black out an entire city. A swarm could measure as much as five by 25 miles and in one day eat enough food to feed a community for three months. For millennia they ravaged a fifth of the world—from India across the Arab World and the Sahara into Africa—threatening the livelihood of an eighth of humanity. Voracious is euphemistic; these insects carried the threat of famine on their wings, and neither fire nor prayer had stopped their onslaught.

In 1960 EPTA and the Special Fund joined together with FAO and 42 countries afflicted with desert locusts to launch an all-out campaign to conquer this scourge. Locust control thus became the first project in a long and productive line of interregional and global (research) projects which have become a distinctive and valuable feature of UNDP programming. This first interregional project was exceptional not only because it spread across three continents, but because it set a precedent in large-scale expenditures under the Programme.

Over $7 million went into the battle against this insect that had known virtually no natural enemies. For six years squadrons of aircraft hunted down locust swarms. Powerful insecticides, not harmful to crops, livestock, or people, proved the weapon that worked. Four more years were added to the six, and planes flew over 11 million square miles, seeking out and killing the plague.

As a preventive measure, experts studied migration and breeding patterns. Using information gathered from word of mouth and weather satellite images, they located breeding grounds of locusts and destroyed them. To ward off future attacks some 200 trainees from 35 countries learned aerial surveillance and spraying techniques. Nearly two dozen locust-control field stations became part of an early-warning system.

By 1970, Desert Locust Information Services operated by the London-based Anti-Locust Research Centre (founded in 1945) reported to UNDP officials that they were unable to discover a single swarm. Stations

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throughout the area continue to keep up the vigil. Today UNDP-funded regional projects in Africa research the migration patterns of the red locust and African locusts, as well as maintaining assistance for desert locust control.

Enriched protein

The first global research project began in the year the locusts were defeated. A 1969 visit by UNDP Administrator Paul Hoffman to the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines planted the seed that led to UNDP's first global project and the creation of its Division of Global and Interregional Projects (DGIP). In 1970 the Governing Council approved support for a project called "Global One" to develop a high protein maize at the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT—the Spanish acronym) in Mexico.

As early as 1963, scientists at Purdue University had discovered the gene Opaque-2. It had the capacity of producing maize with 70 per cent more lysine and twice as much tryptophan—the essentials of enriched protein. CIMMYT, established in 1966 with Rockefeller Foundation support, carried out a worldwide search for varieties of maize which could not only incorporate the Opaque-2 gene but produce high yields, grow under diverse conditions, be disease resistant and have acceptable qualities of taste, texture and colour. Extensive international testing enabled CIMMYT specialists to select and develop varieties with potential for wide adaptation. On the basis of this work, improved strains were made available to national research centres so further breeding and selection appropriate to local conditions could be done.

The high-lysine maize project is now in its fourth phase, supporting CIMMYT's work in national production programmes which utilize on-farm trials to provide guidance to extension staffs, agronomists and policy-makers in developing countries.

By 1984 CIMMYT had developed more than 600 experimental varieties and carried out 25 national programmes, with dozens of new varieties passing the final stages of testing and entering the market place. Some 25 countries have requested large quantities of seed for on-farm tests and national seed-multiplication programmes. Since Global One began, more than 700 people from 68 countries have completed in-service training in all aspects of maize improvement at CIMMYT. The centre's efforts continue to concentrate on nutritional studies, international testing, and training of developing country scientists.



C O N V E R G E N C E

Much of the informal "corridor discussion at the sixty-third meeting of the Special Fund's 18-nation Governing Council in January 1964, focussed on the rapid growth in the number of newly independent countries achieving independence from colonization and the resulting explosion in demand for development assistance. Even before their independence, many Anglophone colonies had been gaining EPTA/Special Fund assistance to help them bridge the transition to nationhood. United Nations system advisors helped in advance to draft mining legislation and fishing agreements and otherwise build up the legal infrastructure for a newly independent state. Upon independence, the two funds lent further help through operational assistance (OPAS) agreements, which provided highly qualified personnel to serve directly in key government or public service capacities (as directors of water supply, meteorology, etc.) until qualified nationals could be prepared to take their place. In a number of newly independent countries, OPAS personnel literally filled the gap left by departing senior colonial officers.

Special Fund were hard pressed to meet the demands of this decolonization process. The issue of a larger, central funding organization, even of a new United Nations capital development fund to help meet burgeoning needs, was again the subject of informal debate and speculation. Suggestions involving a transformation of existing mechanisms caught the attention of the Special Fund's Managing Director, Paul Hoffman. "This," he told the representatives of governments, "is a problem which is distinctly the responsibility of the Governing Council itself; it is the responsibility of your (Special Fund) staff to administer the Programmes and not to make decisions on questions of this type.

Neither fund was equipped for theoretical studies nor possessed of a "think tank." Yet out of practical experience and necessity, ideas and innovations flowed as the Programmes evolved. In August 1964 the Economic and Social Council, in resolution 1020 (XXXVII), recommended a merger of certain key aspects of EPTA and the Special Fund into a new United Nations development programme and commissioned a study by outside consultants toward that end. In February 1965 the study, by the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University, confirmed the merger as a

"The challenge is clear. It is no less than the desperate need to narrow the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the world. If we fail in that, we shall fail in all else."
Representative of the United Kingdom, 1966

"Creation of UNDP, the largest multinational assistance programme in the world, is a giant step towards...accelerating the fight on a worldwide scale to free mankind from want."
Representative of Italy, 1966

"Let us give them a mandate to carry on their excellent work with our full support—financial and moral." *Representative of Nigeria, 1966*

"We see the results of many years of preparation now coming to fruition; we see an entire network of activities taking shape designed to break the vicious circle enclosing the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America." *Representative of the Philippines, 1967*

"We attach particular importance to the expanding role of the UNDP."
Representative of Canada, 1967

"The partnership between UNDP and the recipient countries, founded on clear mutual obligation, is helping to develop new productive forces within those countries."
Representative of Romania, 1967

"These programmes have already made an invaluable contribution to the economic and social progress of the developing countries...a splendid record of achievement."
Representative of India, 1966

"I would like to repeat what I have said so often, and believe so strongly, that we set the highest value on the help which the United Nations has given and continues to give our country. Without it, our future...would indeed be bleak." *Representative of Lesotho, 1967*

"Its success will contribute a great deal to the success of the struggle we are waging against underdevelopment...its failure would plunge mankind into dreadful suffering, and prove that international co-operation is a failure." *Representative of Tunisia, 1966*

means to "a more effective UN assistance programme leading to national economic development by improving human skills, by efficiently utilizing natural resources and by increasing capital investment. While some administrative savings in the new UNDP may be achieved, the overriding purpose of the merger should be to reach the best possible UN development programme for the funds donated by participating states."

The 1965 General Assembly put the recommendation into effect by resolution 2029 (XX). It was convinced that the merger "would simplify organizational arrangements and procedures" and "facilitate overall planning and needed coordination of the several types of technical cooperation programmes carried on." It also recognized that "requests for assistance on the part of developing countries are steadily increasing in volume and scope." Paul Hoffman was named Administrator of the new programme and David Owen Co-Administrator. UNDP would have a single Governing Council representing 37 countries, 19 of them developing.

The Consensus of 1970

UNDP was born on 1 January 1966. Day-to-day operational work went on much as before, drawing upon and gaining from the special strengths of its merged predecessors. EPTA had pioneered in the establishment of a field network and in comprehensive programming, and it had forged critical links between recipient countries and the participating agencies—links now almost taken for granted. The Special Fund had added a multifaceted dimension to technical assistance which would continue to grow and diversify under UNDP. Because its projects were bigger, longer-term and more costly, the Special Fund also carried out more in-depth evaluations of its work and pressed higher standards of project formulation and implementation on Executing Agencies and governments alike. The two funds were natural allies and close collaborators and, under the tutelage of the two far-seeing men who administered them, had quickly moved into a pragmatic operational relationship, thereby assuring the viability and dynamism of their single successor.

As with EPTA at its founding, the General Assembly had left virtually all operational details of the merged Programme to the supervision of the 37-member Governing Council and the good sense of the Administrator and Co-Administrator. What was unclear was the operational capacity of the United Nations system to carry out a larger development role, with larger centrally-funded resources. It was to this organizational and managerial task that UNDP and its Governing Council now turned their attention.

In 1968 the Council at the initiative of the Administrator designated Sir Robert Jackson as a "Commissioner" to produce just such a capacity study in consultation with the Inter-Agency Consultative Board (which replaced TAB). Completed in September 1969, it was a massive undertaking which resulted in five volumes and 600 pages of analysis and documentation. In his foreword to the study Sir Robert set forth the complexity of the system which "is built up of the administrative structures of the United Nations and its component parts, such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNCTAD, etc., and of about a dozen Specialized Agencies. In theory, it

is under the control of about thirty separate governing bodies." He traced the independent headquarters-regional-country office patterns of the components, and then concluded:

"UNDP is the principal organization affected by this situation... In a sense it is possible to think of UNDP as a main gear wheel, with each of the Agencies as another important wheel, all of which must mesh together if the mechanism is to function effectively and thus create a system. It follows logically that UNDP must be reinforced with whatever managerial manpower is needed to introduce necessary changes."

The Capacity Study stirred considerable controversy both within and without the United Nations. Its tone and thrust were positive and supportive of United Nations assistance, but it frankly criticized each partner in the system—UNDP, the agencies, governments—for their inevitable shortcomings. Indeed, the cumulative impact of a number of such studies—by individual donor countries, by the United Nations Committee for Development Planning, by the commission on development then headed by Lester B. Pearson of Canada—all pointed toward a new look for UNDP. The Programme had to demonstrate its ability to fashion a "second generation" mechanism capable of more effective, timely and systematic delivery of a greater volume of assistance. All the studies agreed on the need for more deliberate matching of country requests for assistance to available resources, on more forward-planned and co-ordinated programming, on better project design and formulation and on improved quality and timeliness of implementation.

Consideration of these matters by the Governing Council in 1970 produced a "Consensus" on the future of the Programme that has served as a basic mandate and cornerstone for the past 15 years. Endorsed by the General Assembly in the same year, the Consensus and its required organizational and procedural changes were put into effect in 1971 and over the next few years. The former vagueness on operational practicalities was resoundingly replaced by a systematic restructuring:

- The Programme would estimate its volume of contributions and plan its activities on the basis of five-year development co-operation cycles.
- Country programmes would be drawn up as before, but would seek to coincide with the country's own development plan, identifying the role and phasing of UNDP's inputs which fell within the country's development objectives.
- Regional, interregional and global programmes would also be introduced, each designed not only to increase intercountry co-operation but also as a means of economizing and drawing together critical masses of resources to meet common problems and objectives more efficiently.
- Global programming was designed to meet developing country research needs in such common areas as agriculture, disease control, pure water supplies, etc.

This emphasis on comprehensive technical co-operation programmes, to be set up and carried out by governments themselves, was matched by internal administrative restructuring of UNDP. Bureaux were established at headquarters for four geographical regions, plus a Division for Global and Interregional Projects. Authority for effective programming and implementation at all stages was substantially decentralized from headquarters to UNDP Resident Representatives, for more cohesive team leadership at the country level. The era of remote-controlled development, with its frustrations and misunderstandings, was coming to an end.

The IPF system

There were other changes wrought by the Consensus. For example, the Governing Council itself was expanded to 48 members. But perhaps the most important innovation came in the engineering of Programme allocations under the five-year development co-operation scenario. The first such cycle was set for 1972 to 1976, but how would resources be distributed for the forward planning required in new country programmes, and how much would be available?

In the two years following the Consensus the Council diligently addressed itself to these issues:

First, it determined the total volume of resources which might be available to the Programme by agreeing to a growth target in voluntary contributions from all Governments of 9.6 per cent a year. This would yield a total of $1.5 billion in programmable resources for 1972-76.

Next, it agreed that 15 per cent of projected

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resources should be used for regional, inter-regional and global projects, with the latter two obtaining 1 per cent each.

Then, the remaining 85 per cent of estimated resources would go to country allocations. Here the Council debated long and hard on objective criteria for the division of the largest single pool of multilateral grant aid funds in the world. Should special consideration be given to the poorest countries? To newly independent states? To island or landlocked countries? Should there be a cut-off point for upper income developing countries? What about the efforts being made in pursuit of social justice—should they be "rewarded?" Or countries which defied General Assembly resolutions—should they be "punished?"

The possibilities, economic and political, seemed endless. Perhaps never before had governments devoted more time and effort to devising a fair and equitable system of worldwide allocations. In the end, good sense and a basic, simple formula won out. The Programme would continue as universal—no cut-off point for higher-income developing countries. But each country would be assigned an "indicative planning figure" (IPF) based on its population and per capita gross national product level, ensuring the largest amounts for the poorest and most populous countries. Countries designated by the General Assembly as "least developed" would receive added IPF allocations. In addition, a small reserve fund would be set aside to meet the special needs of newly independent countries, emergency and disaster relief situations and, at the Administrator's discretion, to attend to other special problems (balance of payments difficulties, structural reforms, etc.).

In practical terms, measurable need had now replaced happenstance and "first come, first served" as a framework for Programme assistance. The IPF system has served as a continuing basis for UNDP allocations covering three programming cycles of 15 years. And in each succeeding cycle lower-income and least developed countries have, under the Governing Council's direction, received a progressively larger share of the Programme's resources (see chart). In establishing the IPF system, UNDP and its Governing Council made another contribution. For the first time, a rational, flexible and objective system of development resource allocations had been hammered out by nations in concert.

* David Owen, UNDP's Co-Administrator, had resigned in 1969 to become Secretary-General of the International Planned Parenthood Federation.



Building self-reliance

Having helped set UNDP on a new course, Paul Hoffman retired as Administrator in January 1972.* For Hoffman, the years at the United Nations were, he said, "the best years of my life" and his stewardship of UNDP "the most fascinating job I've ever had."

He was succeeded by Rudolph A. Peterson, a former Chairman of the Bank of America and director of a U.S. Presidential task force on international development assistance which had recommended increased U.S. reliance on multilateral forms of development assistance. For Peterson, the goal was an organization "respected for its performance." He had built his banking career on organizational ability, and his four-year term as UNDP Administrator saw a major expansion and strengthening of the field office network. By the end of his term the decentralization process mandated by the Consensus was virtually complete, and UNDP's development service network had become a recognized centre of on-scene problem solving.

At the same time the development effort at large was going through a periodic process of re-examination. The prospects for building self-sustained growth seemed not to have improved sufficiently after more than 20 years of intensive activity. In 1975 UNDP itself undertook a major self-examination and analysis of the lessons of experience,* and the Governing Council acted to broaden the Programme's mandate to include "new dimensions" of assistance and to sharpen the focus on its single key objective. "The basic purpose of technical co-operation," the Council declared, "should be the promotion of self-reliance in developing countries, by building up, *inter alia*, their productive capability and their indigenous resources—by increasing the availability of the managerial, technical, administrative and research capabilities required in the development process."

The new dimensions authorized were themselves designed to liberate the Programme from the operational constraints of the traditional project "package" of foreign experts, fellowships and imported equipment. They encouraged programming and project support to range wider, deeper and more flexibly to obtain needed results. New dimensions broke from stereotyped formulas to move UNDP beyond its traditional means of providing assistance. To these ends, UNDP's administration was authorized:

- to adopt more liberal and flexible policies toward the local purchase of equipment and materials;
- to diversify its sources of supply in developing countries, particularly, and give preference to procurement in those countries;
- to encourage governments and institutions in developing countries to assume responsibility for the execution of UNDP-financed projects;
- to provide technical support at any level and stage of the development process, including assistance for project planning, pre-feasibility, feasibility, detailed engineering design for investment support and initial management and operation of capital projects; and
- to enter more often into partnership with capital assistance sources.

To an extent, new dimensions sought to turn



* The Future Role of UNDP in World Development in the Context of the Preparations for the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly: New Dimensions in Technical Co-operation (document DP/114).

UNDP on its head—to halt the preoccupation with project inputs and focus instead on project outputs or results, to stop the endless cycle of outside experts and technology and build instead indigenous capacities that would stick. A key measure of the results would be the extent to which they contributed to self-reliance, the only road to self-sustained development. In their detailed application, these concepts of self-reliance constituted another major contribution to the development process which continues to hold sway today.

Progress—and shortfall

Despite inevitable problems of adjustment, the First Development Co-operation Cycle must be counted a remarkable success. Planned country and inter-country expenditures for the five-year period (1972-1976) had been set at $1,537.5 million: actual expenditures totalled $1,654.7 million. The Programme had earmarked $325 million for least developed countries: $333.6 million was actually delivered. During the course of the cycle UNDP fielded an average of 10,000 experts a year to more than 140 developing countries and territories. It provided 28,200 fellowships, almost $238 million in specialized equipment and $188 million in project work subcontracted to consulting firms and institutions.

But beyond the figures the new country programming process provided many inexperienced developing country governments with a means to identify and more systematically structure all their technical co-operation needs. It helped them determine which of those needs could be met by UNDP, which by bilateral programmes and which from their own resources. It contributed to the overall improvement in the quality of UNDP assistance by eliminating unsound or low priority projects and determining future projects on the basis of assessed need rather than advancing those which might be most readily available or persuasively advocated. And it buttressed the efforts of governments to strengthen their machinery for the planning and co-ordination of technical co-operation inputs.

The first cycle also furthered the process of greater cohesion and integration of development at the country level. When the cycle began, many governments were understandably fearful of too tightly organized assistance packages and for a time continued to deal through established channels with other agencies. Gradually, however, governments came to appreciate the value of dealing with one focal point on matters of technical co-operation. They came to regard Resident Representatives as close and valued allies, with shared interests and objectives. Even many bilateral donors came to view UNDP as the team leader for technical co-operation at the country level.

However, in 1975 the organization's good start suffered a severe blow. Fast-rising inflation combined with an unanticipated shortfall in voluntary contributions to create a cash flow problem requiring sudden cutbacks in planned expenditures. For a Programme now geared to integrated, forward planning, which exhorted Governments to set their priorities carefully and stick to them, the ensuing disruptions were both crippling and embarrassing. The situation tended to undercut the relationship of confidence and trust between governments and Resident Representatives built so painfully and arduously over the years. At the same time the crisis required a disheartening, if temporary, re-centralization of decision-making at headquarters, where the Administration struggled to balance financial availability with required cutbacks in the most equitable, least damaging manner.

Innovation and expansion

With time and the introduction of new financial and programming procedures, confidence was restored and decentralized operations re-established. After Peterson's retirement in early 1976, the Programme's third (and current) Administrator, Bradford F. Morse, assumed office. A former U.S. Congressman from Massachusetts and United Nations Under Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs, Morse was well-known in United Nations circles, an energetic figure with a strong reputation for political and negotiating skills. But his first years as Administrator were consumed by organizational and managerial problems. Two key and potentially destabilizing issues also continued to confront the Programme, and Morse turned his considerable energies to a solution of them: a more assured, predictable and continuous base of Programme resources; and, related to that issue, a reversal



* In 1968, UNDP accounted for 80 per cent of United Nations technical co-operation expenditures. Fifteen years later, UNDP's share had fallen to less than half.

in the proliferation of United Nations system funding mechanisms which were undermining UNDP's central funding and co-ordinating role.

From an historical perspective, the evolution of UNDP and its predecessors flowed like a river between the constraints and opportunities afforded by the governments which set its policies and to which it was responsible. Alarmed themselves at the proliferation of funding agencies and the steady fragmentation of development activities,* governments afforded another such opportunity in 1977, when the General Assembly moved to restructure the social and economic sectors of the United Nations system. The issues for UNDP in the restructuring had been posed by the Administrator to the Governing Council in January 1977. He asked the Council to clarify, in particular, the nature of UNDP's substantive contribution as team leader at the field level, its co-ordinating role within the United Nations development system and its role as a funding channel for technical co-operation.

The response from the Governing Council in June was a call for greater coherence and improvement in the substantive co-ordination of field activities. It requested UNDP and its agency partners to develop further their planning, appraisal and evaluation functions and to consolidate these into a comprehensive system of analysis and feedback. It invited the Administrator to improve and expand the country programming framework to include, where governments so desired, other sources of assistance. It urged governments to assist in maintaining the coherence of the system by avoiding the creation of new technical co-operation funds or alternately by placing such funds, to the extent possible, under the UNDP administrative framework. And it urged governments to consider the possibility both of multi-year contributions to the Programme and of equitable sharing in the responsibility for providing resources.

These recommendations were strongly endorsed by the General Assembly. In the annex to its restructuring resolution (32/197), it urged "improved coherence of action and effective integration." "The United Nations Development Programme country programming process should be utilized as a frame of reference for the operational activities carried out and financed by the organizations of the United Nations system from their own resources," the resolution declared. It went on to decide that "overall responsibility for, and co-ordination of, operational activities for development carried out at the country level should be entrusted to a single official" — a resident co-ordinator who would normally be the UNDP Resident Representative.

Slowly but surely, the system responded to these measures. The growth in proliferating mechanisms was halted, if not reversed. A more integrated effort gradually replaced fragmentation at the country level. But a more assured, predictable and continuous base of Programme support was harder in coming. In the second programming cycle (1977-1981), the Governing Council increased the annual growth target for resources from 9.6 to 14 per cent, partly due to rapidly rising inflation rates. And like the first cycle, the second cycle came near to meeting its much larger target, although a serious fall-off in resources became apparent by 1980, when multilateral assistance generally entered a phase of decline. In the third cycle (1982-1986), the 14 per cent target was retained, though never reached in any one year as of 1985. It fell victim to stagnating levels of official development assistance, generally, and a decline in such multilateral assistance, specifically. (See chart on voluntary contributions.)

In his statement to the Second Committee of the General Assembly in September 1981, Administrator Morse argued the real value of multilateral co-operation as follows:

> "It is not just that multilateral co-operation helps to augment and complement development resources from varied sources on a world-wide basis. It is not just that such co-operation tends objectively to strengthen all countries — and hence the world economy.... Nor is it only that such co-operation has over the years succeeded in making development a truly world-wide undertaking, involving not only countries of the North but also countries of the South in mutual support of each other. Multilateral assistance, through its promotion of economic and technical co-operation among developing countries themselves, has sponsored many new and innovative development activities around the world and is

Voluntary Contributions, 1950 – 1985



building on these activities....

"The real value of multilateral co-operation lies inherently in what the international community has invested in our system for more than 30 years — not merely the growing moral commitment of every country to a world free of poverty but the practical commitment of all countries working together on behalf of a steadily improving world economy.... We must not now yield to what the Secretary-General has so fearfully described as 'the present tendencies towards fragmentation, dispersal of effort and unilateralism, which are in the end policies of weakness, lack of confidence and despair.' "

Despite these and other pleas, funding levels continued to lag in terms of voluntary contributions. In 1983 a concerned Governing Council established a special committee of all its members to examine, systematically, the Programme's resource base and make recommendations for its improvement. Although agreement on a multi-year replenishment of UNDP financial resources did not emerge, a number of landmark recommendations did help to strengthen the Programme's prospects. For example, the Administrator was authorized by the Council to consult informally with governments in advance to determine appropriate funding levels on which both IPFs and annual budgets could be more securely allocated. In the case of five-year cycles, the aim would be to increase the number of significant donors and to promote a more equitable pattern of contributions among existing donors. The Council also appealed for supplementary contributions to help close the resource gap which had reduced IPF expenditures to 55 per cent of their third cycle illustrative level, and recommended that governments henceforth make their best efforts to maintain the real value of their contributions as a minimum objective. Finally, it authorized the Administrator, with the agreement of the recipient countries concerned, to provide management support services on a remunerated basis to bilateral assistance efforts.

Lessons of history

In fact, other Governing Council decisions had over the years been expanding the aggregate resources at the disposal of UNDP in other ways. The real level of core expenditures, allowing for inflation, was hardly greater in 1985 than in 1972, when the first cycle began. But total resources under the Programme almost doubled the actual volume of delivery in real terms. This is because new funds were indeed established under the UNDP administrative framework and new means of financing were increasingly being permitted.

By 1983, for example, UNDP was administering ten separate trust funds with expenditures of $50 million or more a year. These funds, linked with the UNDP country programming process, included the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries; the United Nations Capital Development Fund, which provides capital grants for grassroots and infrastructure projects first and foremost among least developed countries; the United Nations Volunteers, furnishing low-cost middle-level expertise to more than 90 developing countries, as well as support for domestic development services; the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, providing on a refundable basis high-risk financing, expertise and technology for the technical and economic assessment of untapped mineral and geothermal

resources; the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office, assisting in the medium and long-term recovery and rehabilitation of eight drought-afflicted countries of West Africa and in combatting desertification across Africa south of the Sahara under the United Nations Plan of Action; the Financing System for Science and Technology for Development; the Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women; the UNDP Energy Account, financing projects for new and renewable energy sources; the Special Fund for Landlocked Developing Countries; and the Trust Fund for Namibia, designed to help that last remaining colonial country in Africa bridge its transition to independence.

With the growth of financial constraints, recipient and donor governments alike had turned increasingly to cost-sharing arrangements by which both projects and programmes could be enlarged and expanded case-by-case through special contributions in convertible currencies. By 1984 such cost-sharing contributions totalled almost $84 million, of which 75 per cent was contributed by developing countries themselves.

Other arrangements included the establishment of trust funds by the Administrator. In 1983 some $50.2 million were made available under five such funds. The two largest were a special grant of $6.6 million from the Netherlands to assist least developed countries and a transfer of $40 million in assets from the United Nations Emergency Operation Trust Fund to assist countries threatened by drought and famine and to support increased technical co-operation among developing countries.

By the end of 1984 total resources available under all such means of financing amounted to $835 million, including some $650 million in voluntary contributions to UNDP's core resources. If the reported volume of parallel financing of projects, in which third parties join to support UNDP/government activities,* were added in, UNDP was generating almost a billion dollars in technical co-operation a year, or roughly four times the amount generated in the first year of the first cycle — 1972.

The Programme had also greatly expanded in other ways. The number of organizations acting as executing agencies under UNDP-supported projects had grown from the original six in 1950 to 28 — or 29 including UNDP's own Office for Projects Execution, established in 1973. Undoubtedly this represents the broadest pool of specialized talent ever assembled for any enterprise. At country levels UNDP Resident Representatives also represent the United Nations Department of Technical Co-operation for Development, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Disaster Relief Office, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and the Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women.

In other ways, UNDP had become directly involved in almost every important development initiative of the last three decades. Together with the World Bank and FAO, it co-sponsors the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, whose network of 13 research centres has been largely responsible for the strong growth in agricultural output in so many developing countries. With WHO and the World Bank, UNDP co-sponsors a Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases — an attack on the seven major killers and cripplers found throughout the world: malaria, schistosomiasis, filariasis, river blindness, trypanosomiasis, leprosy and leishmaniasis.

UNDP has assumed the chairmanship of three salient international steering committees — one for inter-agency co-operative action on the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, designed to provide clean water and adequate sanitation for all; another on joint technical assistance measures for a group of Caribbean nations; and a third for the internationally-supported Centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research in Dhaka.

The Programme also led in promoting new approaches in development. UNDP served as substantive secretariat for the first United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC), held in Buenos Aires in September 1978, and its field offices now serve as focal points for this form of collective self-reliance. Following the International Year of the Disabled, UNDP joined with WHO, UNICEF and the United Nations Centre for Social and Humanitarian Affairs to sponsor IMPACT, a privately funded programme to promote wide adoption of proven, low-cost measures designed to prevent avoidable

* Parallel financing differs from cost-sharing mainly in a technical sense: funds are provided directly to the project without UNDP's own accounting procedures being drawn into play.

disabilities and the needless physical impairment of hundreds of millions of people throughout the developing world. UNDP has also strengthened its ties, particularly at the field level, with hundreds of non-governmental organizations which collectively contribute more than $2 billion a year to the development effort. With a go-ahead from the Governing Council and the express consent of the recipient governments, UNDP has sought to tap the expertise and the collaboration of the high-technology private sector for the benefit of development. It sponsored and gave substantive support to the process of roundtable consultations with donors for the special benefit of least developed countries; by 1985, 25 of the 36 LDCs were using UNDP as lead agency for the preparation, conduct and follow-up of such consultations. It established an Inter-Agency Procurement Services Unit for low-cost, bulk purchases of common project equipment; a Joint Policy Committee with UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP for closer programming collaboration; and a Central Evaluation Office for more systematic review and feedback of project implementation and results.

By 1985, on its 35th anniversary, UNDP and its predecessor organizations had received almost $8.5 billion in voluntary contributions from 175 countries, developing and developed alike, with an additional $520 million in contributions to funds under its administration. It had fielded some 185,000 experts in almost every sector, awarded 136,000 fellowships for specialized study by developing country nationals abroad, expended more than $1.3 billion on specialized equipment for projects and $885 million in subcontracted services. Almost 160 developing countries and territories had benefitted from these inputs, and they had also provided inputs from their own limited budgets. Among the early beneficiaries of the Programme's help in the 1950s were such countries as Finland, Italy, Japan and Spain, each of which went on to become substantial donors to the Programme.

Figures, however, cannot begin to tell the full story. The work of technical co-operation cannot easily be judged by measurable outcomes. Each project has an important qualitative result and leaves more behind by way of demonstration effects and multiplier consequences than can be measured by strict, quantitative project results. The formal and informal interactions unleashed in project implementation, the kinds of organizational arrangements arrived at and research required to analyse and manage a particular problem, cannot be aggregated or summed up in numerical terms. But they are surely reflected in the development record of the past 35 years and the heartening improvement in the human condition since 1950.

Here was a Programme which never accounted for more than 3 per cent, at most, of world-wide official development assistance flows.

Here was an organization which, until 1981, did not even have a separate, small resource office to assist in the complex task of raising voluntary contributions from 170 governments for its own core resources and for the ten development funds it administered.

Here was a programme which had one of the smallest public information operations of any development organization.

Above all, here was an operational Programme concerned with management and day-to-day administrative problems without a "think tank" for devising development strategies or breakthroughs.

And yet, here was a Programme which could claim to its credit innovative and important contributions to the new and scientific discipline of development. It was UNDP and its predecessors which:

- embodied from the start the need for a multi-dimensional, integrated and cross-sectoral approach to development;
- first devised and applied the concept of integrated country and inter-country programming;
- built the world's largest development service network and demonstrated the vital advantages of a continuous, on-scene dialogue with recipients;
- established the IPF system for an objective, systematic and equitable allocation of development resources; and
- made self-reliance and collective self-reliance the supreme objective of the development process itself, with all the policy and programming implications stemming from that central concept.

Above all, perhaps, in such a list of "intangibles," UNDP spread the important concept of international co-operation and collaboration toward a common goal in the interest of all. Its work cut across boundaries, ideologies, religions, races and genders and sought to set aside political motivation in the objective interest of an expanding world economy. It brought together in this task men and women of all nationalities serving, often in remote and difficult areas, the common good. It helped make neighbours of all people—a Belgian working in Indonesia and an Indonesian working in Somalia, a Canadian on assignment to Colombia and a Colombian in a project in Equatorial Guinea.

Indeed, UNDP and its predecessors were intended to be more than an aid channel which happened to be under the United Nations flag. They were intended to be what UNDP has in fact become: an effective and trusted multilateral development service, a partnership of equality between developing and developed countries alike, bringing, through the expertise of UN system agencies, needed technical co-operation in almost every sector of the human adventure.

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TOKTEN: An Innovation That Spread

The idea originated in Turkey in 1977, when a California-based senior mechanical engineer of Turkish origin made a three-week visit to the UNDP-assisted Karadeniz Technical University. It was apparent that the common language and cultural background greatly enhanced the engineer's exchange with Turkish colleagues. Thus arose TOKTEN—the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals.

With UNDP encouragement and support, Turkey designed the first TOKTEN project. By 1984 there were over 300 consultancies there, with 25 per cent of them returning for follow-up visits.

To date some 17 countries* have participated in the TOKTEN programme. Since its inception nearly a thousand consultancies by expatriates have been completed in such fields as micro-electronics, bio-engineering, marine sciences, animal husbandry, solar energy utilization, environmental pollution control, library sciences and urban planning. TOKTEN has proved a remarkable means of mitigating the "brain drain."

Pakistan. Jawed Hamid devised and helped establish an immunology laboratory at the National Health Research Institute. Plans are now underway to set up four regional units elsewhere in the country.

Turkey. The Aksehirlis, a husband and wife team who are metallurgical and mining engineers respectively, both offered seminars in Turkey. Mr. Aksehirli also assisted in improving an operating furnace, completing a molten bath furnace and assembling another during their stay.

Philippines. Nelson Consumo, working with the Atomic Energy Commission in Manila, gave lectures and also reviewed and evaluated piping designs, construction documents and procurement specifications.

Greece. Zisos Katsiapis adapted his own linear programming techniques to the requirements of his native country. During his TOKTEN assignment he was appointed to the Greek Petroleum Procurement Committee, where he assisted with feasibility studies and formulated a proposal to reorganize the Petroleum Monopoly of Greece to conform with the requirements of the European Economic Community. Following his consultancy, Mr. Katsiapis accepted the offer of the Minister of Finance to remain in Greece as an Advisor in the above field.

Results have been exceptionally successful, and many more projects are pipelined. UNDP's TOKTEN Global Unit, a part of the Division for Global and Interregional Projects, assists in identifying consultants and in preparing feasibility studies for Governments wishing to join the programme. Central African Republic and Guinea have finalized agreements for TOKTEN projects, and ten other countries have expressed interest in sharing programmes.

The advantages of TOKTEN extend beyond the lessening of linguistic and cultural barriers. Expatriates volunteer their services; only their travel and living expenses are covered under the programme. The cost of the average consultancy comes to between $2,500 and $4,500 per man-month—roughly half the cost of the traditional forms of technical expertise. Candidates need not be specifically from a given country in order to fit the profile of a TOKTEN consultant; regions sharing languages and cultural ties can be served by expatriates of similar background. Group consultancies are also being considered.

* Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, China, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Trinidad and Tobago.

China, Asia and TCDC

Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC) existed long before the Buenos Aires Conference UNDP organized in 1978. For example, China in the 1950s was involved in technical co-operation with over 70 other developing countries. Over the years some 180,000 Chinese engineers and technicians as well as medical personnel have worked in some 40 developing countries, and China has had science and technology exchanges in more than 5,400 projects with 21 countries.

Against this background, China hosted the first Regional consultations with nine other countries of the Asia and Pacific region to formulate joint TCDC programmes. Held in Beijing in November 1983, this seven-day parley, partly financed by UNDP, brought together representatives of China, Fiji, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand, plus UNDP's Resident Representative in China and representatives from ESCAP, UN/DTCD, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, FAO, WHO and ECWA.

Plans for some 32 bilateral and four regional exchanges were worked out between China and seven of the participating countries. China would receive expertise under a dozen of the bilateral projects, and provide expertise for 20 others. China and its partners would absorb all the in-country costs of project activities. Support was requested from the United Nations system to meet international travel expenses of experts and trainees amounting to approximately $140,000.

By mid-1984 the international expenses for over 20 projects had been secured. The projects drawing on Chinese expertise include:

- Water wheels. Chinese experts will help Sri Lanka install two prototypes of tube chain water wheels, one hand operated, the other animal drawn.
- Bamboo and rattan weaving. Chinese experts will teach their methods in Fiji over a two-year period.
- Biogas. China's advanced research and development in low-cost biogas technology offers a source of inexpensive fuel, better sanitation, and also a by-product — rich, organic fertilizer. Training courses at China's biogas research, training and extension centre are planned for the Asian region (as well as Latin America), and one of the bilateral exchanges coming out the Beijing consultations is for the development of biogas technology in Fiji.
- Aquaculture. For centuries the Chinese have bred freshwater fish with outstanding proficiency. In rice fields, the fish feed on harmful insects and their larvae help free paddies of weeds and loosen and fertilize the earth for greater grain yields. Feasibility projects in fish farming are being implemented in the Philippines and in Thailand.

- Acupuncture. Chinese training in acupuncture anaesthesia and treatment of diseases of domestic animals began in Sri Lanka in the autumn of 1984 as another exchange. Exchanges with Thailand and Fiji also include acupuncture components.
- Pumps. The Chinese will undertake feasibility studies in Nepal for a demonstration water turbine pump station in mountainous areas.

Other exchanges have been arranged between China and the Maldives, including feasibility studies for marine fishing, adaptation of solar stoves, and a training course in primary health care management. Chinese training of Pakistanis in the use of industrial wastes to produce building materials and in the application of medical lasers for curing eye disease constitutes another component.

Conversely, Pakistan will extend training in silverware manufacture to China; Sri Lanka will introduce its methods of black tea processing and rubberwood treatment, as well as cultivation of an improved soya bean variety. Fiji will introduce a sugar cane variety, while a new rice variety will come from the Philippines. Thailand will exchange methods for cultivation and preservation of tropical grapes and citrus, along with Thai bamboo and rattan weaving techniques. In addition, other technical exchanges include workshops on the exchange of technical and economic information, on aquaculture and primary health care, and consultancies and training on soil erosion and sedimentation and agricultural machinery.

The promotion of technical co-operation in the Asian region is by no means confined to China:

- India, through its technical and economic co-operation programme initiated in 1965, has sent hundreds of Indian specialists in various sectors to provide know-how to other countries. Some 1,500 developing country professionals have come to India each year to receive training.
- Indonesia has established an umbrella TCDC project for training in such diverse fields as building materials and human settlements, highway engineering, sanitary engineering, water resources development, rural housing, agricultural extension training, rehabilitation of the physically handicapped, press and public relations, handloom weaving, integrated family planning, remote sensing, secondary education, community health, nature conservation and wild-life management. Bhutan, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and Samoa are among the participating countries.
- Sri Lanka is undertaking a similar umbrella project to promote TCDC in a number of sectors, with specific attention to the acquisition and adaptation of technologies.

TODAY & TOMORROW



"Technical assistance is the base on which all other forms of assistance are built. If technical assistance is not adequate, it creates problems for all other forms."

Representative of Sweden, 1981

"UNDP has become the most important vehicle through which aid to needy countries is being channelled. We are convinced that any shortfall of UNDP resources would no doubt constitute a blow of incalculable consequences"

Representative of Pakistan, 1981

In the early, informal days, the small staff of EPTA sat around a middling conference table in New York each day deciding United Nations development assistance priorities and procedures. These were exciting, innovative times when a new Programme, a new prospect for humankind, were opening before the world. A spirit of experiment and untested hope prevailed.

Today UNDP is a large organization. Four thousand people staff its complex, worldwide network. The creative path is set by firmly established, widely familiar rules and policies. The marks of a substantial, multinational endeavour are there for all to see and examine.

Yet, in the Programme's far-flung 115 field offices where almost 90 per cent of UNDP staff are concentrated, similarly small and highly motivated groups still fit around conference tables. The intimacy, the sense of challenge and experiment, of a special mandate to help and assist, still prevail. In New York some of the direct excitement may have yielded to the more mundane but no less pressing and practical tasks of back-up and funding. The urgency of the unknowns, the vast needs yet to be met and the demands of recurring emergencies remain. UNDP is not so far from its origins as some, in nostalgia, might assume.

In the interceding years, moreover, vast numbers of the technical and operational problems have been solved through sheer trial and error. A system of "continuous country programming" now ensures close and on-the-spot dialogue with the Programme's 154 recipients, not only on UNDP and United Nations system inputs but for a broader range of inputs, frequently including those from bilaterals and NGOs. A central system of evaluation ensures in-depth analysis and feedback in specific areas and sectors. Once tentative operating mechanisms are widely accepted and understood. Computerized programming and financial management systems enable the flexible administration of budget lines and expenditures. At the field level, the Country Programme Management Plan (CPMP) and other operational tools help to ensure a balance of responsiveness and effectiveness in the administration and management of implementation.

Administrator Morse put it this way in 1984: "I cannot say that we have solved all our problems. But I can say that we have met them head on, that we have worked hard with the Governing Council to overcome them, and that noteworthy progress is apparent. I give you a UNDP whose resource situation has shown signs of real improvement, whose capacities and working methods are respected by the international community, whose key task — the building of self-reliance — is finding new modes of expression and whose flexibility and responsiveness — severely tested by recent difficulties — have passed the test.

Some Measures of Impact

The combined effect of these improvements have extended the multiplier effect of Progamme impact. In preparing this anniversary publication, UNDP asked its field offices for examples of projects which have made a difference or had noteworthy impact in the countries they serve. Many were drawn from recently concluded or on-going activities in such sectors as:

Agricultural and rural development. In Burma, rice production as a result of UNDP assistance has advanced 3.5 times as fast as population growth. In Sao Tome and Principé UNDP has helped restore pig production—a basis of the local diet—after a swine plague wiped out stocks in 1979. In Zambia the Programme has helped safeguard meat and milk production by building self-sufficiency in control of livestock diseases through vaccine production and intervention in tick ecology. As part of agrarian reform efforts in Peru, UNDP has financed an audio-visual teaching and training project which has reached large numbers of farmers with instruction in such areas as administration and accounting procedures for farm production, marketing, storage, environmental improvement, rural construction, well-drilling, natural resource management and agricultural and livestock production techniques.

Natural resources. UNDP support for the Petroleum Development Centre in Turkey has enhanced self-reliance in petroleum exploration, production and related supporting services for a country spending $3.1 billion a year on petroleum imports (36 per cent of all imports). In Argentina, UNDP assistance has developed a centre of excellence for applied hydrology and water resources analysis which has led to a $24 million Inter-American Development Bank loan



"One of the most important avenues for development of human resources is technical assistance programmes such as those of UNDP (which) can be considered as the shortest and most successful way towards technology transfer."

Minister of Finance and National Economy Saudi Arabia, 1983

for water resources development.

In drought-stricken Mali, UNDP began supporting groundwater drilling in 1974, traditional wells in the country having by then run dry. Today, in a 23,000 square kilometre zone, more than 600 pumps have been installed (handpumps made in Mali, and solar pumps) with a capacity that has revolutionized village life and health and solved the food problem in the region without lowering the critical water table. With further assistance from bilateral agencies and the World Bank, this pilot UNDP-supported project is expected to cover all productive regions of the country within 15 years and make of Mali a food self-sufficient nation. In Cape Verde, which has also suffered from severe drought since 1968, the field office has reported similar impact from a series of UNDP-supported water resources development projects, which commenced several months before the country's independence in 1975. In Burkina Faso, after years of fruitless search for underground mineral wealth, gold, zinc lead and plate deposits were discovered in a 1974 project, which is helping to change the country's alarming economic situation. The World Bank is now financing $7.4 million in follow-up feasibility studies.

Development planning. In a number of countries — Bangladesh, Kuwait, Lesotho, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia among them — UNDP-assisted projects have strengthened planning priorities, especially for regional and sectoral planning, which have clearly had the broadest, most pervasive impact. More than any other development assistance agency, UNDP has assisted in the setting of key development priorities and in strengthening the statistical, sectoral and regional requirements on which successful, long-term development depends. In Swaziland UNDP assistance has played the key role in the formulation of an effective development plan for the country.

Transport. A UNDP-assisted project in Paraguay, completed in 1975, has kept the Paraguay River navigable for ships up to 1,500 tons (to a depth of 3.5 meters) from the capital, Asunci-de-n, to its exit in the Atlantic Ocean, thus enabling this land-locked country critical access to the sea. The project has also trained staff of the Port and Navigation Administration at all levels for the implementation of a rational and efficient port and river operation.

In still another land-locked country, Botswana, UNDP with ICAO expertise has helped through a number of small projects setting up the country 's Civil Aviation Department. A large and thinly populated country, Botswana has improved its internal transport facilities to help knit together a viable development framework.

Industry. In India a UNDP-supported demonstration plant for sponge iron production in Andhra Pradesh has succeeded in establishing a sponge iron demonstration unit that produces 30,000-tons-per-year based on non-coking coal. As a result, another kiln was locally constructed at Government cost to double production and two other, similarly patterned plants have been constructed at Bihar and Orissa. In Colombia, UNDP assistance has helped facilitate the development of a vast, open-pit coal mining area near the Venezuelan border which could yield as much as 15 million tons of high-grade coking coal a year by 1989.

The field reports provide many other examples — UNDP assistance for the first medical

training institution in the Cameroon; the upgrading, maintenance and construction of more than 3,300 kilometres of roads in land-locked Burundi; the "outreach" programme for training primary school teachers for rural areas in Sierra Leone. These are but a sampling of the impact UNDP funding has had in a wide cross-section of sectors and needs.

UNDP also asked its field offices for a report on people trained through UNDP assistance over the years — their progress and the positions they hold today. The response was remarkable. Long lists of former UNDP-supported trainees now holding key development positions flowed in. In Burundi some 55 had been tracked and identified. In the Philippines, 128. In Paraguay, more than 70. In India, 34.

In Morocco former fellows of the National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics now include the Institute's director and deputy director and a professor serving as Director of Multinational Co-operation in the Ministry of International Economic Co-operation. A fellow under the Cyprus Water Planning Project (1966) is now director of that country's Water Development Department. In Sierra Leone a High Court Judge, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and the Director of Soils and Water Conservation Services.

Some others who have participated in UNDP-supported training: the Director-General of the Livestock Breeding and Veterinary Department in Burma; the Director of the National Research Centre for Oceanography in Madagascar; the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Malawi; the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance in Pakistan; the Director of Electrical Planning in Haiti; the Director of Meteorological Services in Botswana; the Director of Training at Saudi Arabia's Centre for Training and Applied Research in Community Development; the Deputy Director-General of the Department of Irrigation, Hydrology and Meteorology in Nepal; the Permanent Secretary for Economic Planning in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development in Fiji; the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Breeding in Burkina Faso; the General Manager of the Trinidad and Tobago Telephone Company; the Director-General of State Farms of the Agriculture Ministry in Democratic Yemen; the Director-General of Information and Cultural Information in Iraq; the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering of Chile's Catholic University; Burundi's Director of Planning; Sri Lanka's Secretary of the Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction.

The list could go on at length. Many have been trained in their specialities under fellowships abroad. Others have participated in shorter training programmes and seminars. All know UNDP and are part of its growing international constituency.

Results at an aggregate level (see box on UNDP/ICAO) are equally impressive.

Teachers. UNESCO estimates that since 1960 the cumulative total of teachers having received initial training or in-service training under UNDP-supported projects should surpass one million, some 50 per cent in Africa, 26 per cent in Asia and the Pacific, 16 per cent in Latin

America and 8 per cent in the Arab States.

Engineers. Between 1961 and 1975 UNESCO estimates that engineering faculty projects supported by UNDP in some 36 countries have increased the training capacity of those facilities by 8,000 - 12,000 graduates a year.

Telecommunication specialists. Since 1960 ITU estimates that 77 telecommunications institutions have been established or strengthened with UNDP support, plus six regional and one interregional institution, with thousands of graduates to date.

Industrial staff. ILO reports 10,000 fellows trained under UNDP auspices since 1950, mainly vocational trainees and industrial managers.

Meteorologists. WMO reports 2,457 fellowships awarded and 17 meteorological institutions supported.

Minerals. The United Nations' Department of Technical Co-operation for Development estimates that during 1959-1980 UNDP assisted some 218 non-fuel mineral resources projects in 84 countries at a total (UNDP and government) expenditure of $311 million. Significant mineral discoveries in 15 countries have a total potential value at point of sale to end-users of $41.8 billion (in 1979 dollars). Thus for every dollar of investment about $135 worth of recoverable minerals has been located.

"The role that UNDP continues to play in development cannot be over-emphasized. The numerous projects currently supported by UNDP in many developing countries, and the increasing number of requests that are regularly submitted by them, amply demonstrate the significance of that role."

Representative of Fiji, 1981



Responding to Change

If change is the essence of development, the history of UNDP has shown a measured ability for the Programme itself to adapt to change. In 1984 UNDP presented its Governing Council with a policy paper on measures required to meet the changing technical co-operation needs of the countries it serves. In the decade since "new dimensions," the needs of development had continued to change considerably. For example:

- The problem of refugees, fleeing from natural and man-made disasters, had grown and absorbed increased amounts of international assistance;
- Severe debt management problems had beset countries once considered well on their way to development success;
- A major drought and the threat of famine again imperiled development prospects among the poorest African countries south of the Sahara;
- Non-governmental organizations had become a major force in the development process, with combined development-related expenditures exceeding $2 billion a year. Such continued growth of development sources was giving new impetus to the need for improved co-ordination;
- A new kind of technology gap, stemming from the rapid development of "high tech" industries in industrially advanced countries, was threatening a new division between the world's "haves" and "have-nots";
- The demand for technical co-operation — both "high tech" and such traditional assistance as sectoral and managerial expertise, middle-level training and "grassroots" assistance primarily in rural areas — continued to outstrip concessional aid for technical co-operation purposes. UNDP's Administrator, Bradford Morse, had estimated that only about 20 per cent of all concessional assistance goes to meet such essential human resource needs;
- Finally, because of declining official development assistance flows, there were growing pressures for improved quality and better results from the assistance available.

In the light of these issues, the Council authorized further steps to give UNDP a stronger, more dynamic role in the development process. For example, it decided "that the assessment and planning of overall technical co-operation needs of the developing countries could provide a useful framework of action for co-ordinated provision of the technical assistance

from external sources, that the country programming process can be a useful vehicle for interested countries in this respect," and requested the Administrator "to assist Governments, at their request, in formulating such programmes."

The Council also endorsed closer co-operation between UNDP and the World Bank and regional development banks, emphasizing in particular the World Bank's capacity for country and sectoral analysis and UNDP's complementary capabilities in the on-site programming and implementation of technical co-operation. It urged the further strengthening of UNDP's field offices and the management and support services they provide to Governments beyond UNDP's own funding. It authorized UNDP to collaborate more closely — in strict accord with the wishes and consent of the developing countries involved — with the private sector in both developed and developing countries, as key sources and users of technical inputs. And it welcomed a UNDP initiative designed to strengthen development at the "grassroots" by helping recipient Governments tap the rapidly expanding potential of non-governmental organizations, and the capacities for self-reliance among communities, in order to spread the benefits of development among the poorest and enable them to become a stronger force in the development process as a whole. To accomplish such new activities, the Governing Council again urged strong support by all Governments for contributions to UNDP's central resources, which also provide the needed basis for the many special funds and services and co-ordinating responsibilities carried out under the Programme.

"...All Governments have a serious responsibility to provide this proven institution, which they themselves have created, with the resources it must have if the international development effort is not to falter."

Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of the General Assembly, 1981

Since the Governing Council of June 1984, UNDP has moved to strengthen the professional staffing of key field offices, particularly in least developed and drought-afflicted countries. It has already joined with the World Bank and with the OECD Development Assistance Committee in ways to improve UNDP-supported donor round-tables for least developed countries, and in strengthening UNDP's co-ordinating responsibilities for all external assistance on behalf of the drought and famine-stricken countries in Africa.

The Programme is working with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to go beyond refugee relief work and provide a development dimension in host country zones where refugees can be helped into self-sufficiency. It is organizing a workshop and conference on the neglected role of human resources in the development process and in response to an initiative from the Government of Jamaica, has co-hosted an international meeting to harness the potential of public and private sector expertise through the establishment of a manpower facility for developing countries. It is pursuing judicious ways of obtaining and applying to the needs of developing countries more "high tech" transfers from the private sector in developed countries. It is already providing technical assistance to a number of countries facing debt management problems. And it has launched an initiative on Grassroots and NGO matters, with assistance from a standing committee at UNDP headquarters.

UNDP's active role in helping to meet the Africa crisis was underscored in December 1984, when the United Nations Secretary-General appointed Administrator Morse as Director of the new United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa. While Morse also continued his main functions as head of UNDP, a greater share of his day-to-day management tasks was assumed by UNDP's Associate Administrator, G. Arthur Brown of Jamaica, whose administrative and programming skills had long before made their special mark on UNDP.

Morse himself stressed a new three-fold plan of action by UNDP to meet the Africa crisis head on, the key elements of which included:

(a) The focusing of existing regular and supplementary resources on projects in agricultural development and food produc-

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The Roundtable Process in Mali

Since the United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries in 1981, UNDP has been entrusted with organizational responsibilities for donor roundtable meetings designed to mobilize increased international support for the special needs of the 36 poorest developing countries. By the end of 1983, 18 such roundtables had been organized with participation from as many as 80 bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental donor organizations. In fact, however, many of these meetings proved an inadequate basis for addressing the dire needs of the least developed. A "laundry list" of opportune projects in need of support too often replaced the kind of systematic, in-depth analysis of sectors and priorities required to give donors an adequate basis for judgment.

In 1984 UNDP evaluated and reviewed its roundtable procedures and determined on a new and improved format. At the same time, many of the Programme's main donors proposed a greatly expanded co-ordinating role for Resident Representatives in facilitating external assistance to the 10 African countries most severely affected by drought and famine. Mali, which has suffered drought conditions for four years, is one of these countries.

In 1984 the Malian Ministry of Planning approached UNDP for suggestions on the donor roundtable scheduled for that country in 1985. Under a project financed by UNDP and carried out by UN/DTCD, the Mali roundtable would follow the new format agreed to by African Ministers of Planning and by OECD.

First a systematic inventory of some 500 projects in the nation's five-year plan was undertaken, determining in particular the financial status of each. At the same time economists assigned to the roundtable project visited each of the country's seven regions, consulting with local development committees, assessing grassroots development activities and preparing an analysis of existing efforts and mechanisms. Finally, other project economists worked with World Bank and IMF officials analyzing Mali's economic restructuring needs — the marketing and pricing of foodstuffs, employment and investment policies, the reorganization of rural development, the restructuring of the country's many parastatals or state-run enterprises. These economists sought to measure and predict the expected impact of restructuring on Mali's development prospects.

Having thus examined in detail all aspects of Mali's existing economic situation, the project economists turned their attention to proposals for assistance to be brought into the roundtable process. It was decided that a key theme geared to the Government's own development priorities would centre on an effective food strategy (projects for rural development, agro-industry, hydrology, etc.). Mali's own emphasis on grassroots initiatives in the solution of food-related problems would also be promoted, as would measures to reinforce the adjustment programme.

The economists also saw the need to improve management of Mali's natural resources, and in this connexion a region-by-region inventory of actual and potential resources was carried out. Some 50 different resource maps were prepared by project cartographers (for some regions, the detailed resource maps were the first ever undertaken), while the country's demography, the network of transport and communications, health and education needs were also plotted. The roundtable itself will thus have at its disposal the most extensive and detailed analysis, sector-by-sector and region-by-region, of Mali's actual and potential economic situation ever undertaken.

From its start in mid-1984 the project has had strong, active support from the Government and has sought to involve donors in its activities. The project team consults regularly with the major donor representatives in Mali, including those of the World Bank, the European Economic Community, France, U.S.A. and others, as work proceeds on preparing concrete proposals and documents. The critical dialogue with donors and the Government has thus been on-going from the start. In the actual planning for the roundtable meeting the UNDP field office is playing a key organizational, co-ordinating and logistical role.

The kind of systematic planning assistance project being carried out in Mali provides a good example of the new roundtable format in action, and its model activities will be replicated in other least developed countries.

tion, processing and storage, in forestry development, meteorology and drought management, and in development planning and public administration. Where justified, resources would be reallocated to these priority sectors;

(b) The redirection of inputs towards production activities involving grassroots communities and aimed at stimulating their income-generating potential. United Nations Volunteers were being deployed to this purpose;

(c) The reinforcement of macro-economic policy formulation capabilities, and the strengthening of planning mechanisms in Governments. Co-ordinated with World Bank and bilateral measures, this long-range effort offered, in the Administrator's view, the most vital hope for enduring results.

In its 35th Year

Total expenditures under UNDP in 1984 amounted to $717.7 million.* As in previous years, UNDP field offices also reported on the volume of expenditures from non-UNDP sources in 1984 — expenditures which are supported by the Programme's field infrastructure. Like co-financing arrangements, these expenditures do not enter into the main programme balance sheet, but they nevertheless reflect the wide range of UNDP's overall efforts and activities. In 1984, 86 field offices reported assistance in the implementation of more than 1,600 non-UNDP-financed projects with total expenditures of approximately $243.2 million. Of this $243.2 million, UNDP field offices provided major services and support for 1,062 projects with expenditures amounting to $225.4 million. A further 531 projects were assisted to a lesser degree.

On the resource side, the static pattern of voluntary contributions to UNDP, evident since 1982, prevailed again in 1984, despite substantial efforts by major donors to increase their pledges in national currency terms. At the United Nations Pledging Conference for Development Activities in November 1984, nine of the Programme's 16 major donors maintained the real value of their contributions in national currencies in accordance with Governing Council appeals and against the constraining effect of a rapidly appreciating dollar. Six of the nine countries substantially exceeded this minimum level.

*Of which $532.6 million was for field programme activities, $70.1 million for agency support costs, $114.7 million for UNDP administrative and programme support costs and $3.3 million for sectoral support and other field level costs. Of the $532.6 million in field programme expenditure, $436.6 million was expended under indicative planning figure (IPF) resources, $73.5 million under cost-sharing arrangements, $5.3 million under Special Programme Resources, $1.8 million under Special Industrial Services (SIS), $10.3 million under the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries and $5.1 million in Government cash counterpart funds.



A total of 31 countries (27 of them developing countries) met or exceeded the 14 per cent growth rate set for the Third Programming Cycle in terms of their national currencies. Canada, Denmark, Italy and Sweden pledged a further $13.1 million in supplementary contributions for 1984, while five new trust funds were established under the Administrator's authority on behalf of UNDP during the year. Income received in 1984 for these five trust funds amounted to the equivalent of $6.8 million. In addition, 14 sub-trust funds were established on behalf of the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office (UNSO), five on behalf of the United Nations Financing System for Science and Technology for Development (UNFSSTD) and one on behalf of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). The total income received during 1984 for these sub-trust funds amounted to the equivalent of $13.1 million, bringing the overall income for 1984 from these resources to $19.9 million.

The pattern of static central UNDP resources amidst rising supplementary resources under the Programme as a whole was thus maintained. As UNDP ended its 35th year, responsibilities and activities continued to grow, even against a core resource base that was proving far less expansive. The Programme had already undergone a turbulent history of financial ups and downs which had never really stemmed the tide of its long-term growth and diversification. Nor, in all likelihood, could the constraints in funding experienced in 1984 be expected to do so. The demands of development, the increasingly pivotal position of UNDP in the development process, pointed the other way.

Over the years, the Programme had learned and taken to heart a number of important lessons. It had learned that development is a holistic enterprise demanding co-operation by many parties, in many sectors and from many sources. Somewhat to its own surprise, it had learned that technical co-operation, in which it got its start, was the centrepiece of its long-term work and that its pre-investment activities, though critically important and once, under the Special Fund, the lion's share of its efforts, was basically an adjunct. It had learned that emphasis on human resources was the greatest single key to unlocking the door to progress and that development advanced or faltered in step with self-reliant human and institutional capacities. And it had learned that the often frustrating, sometimes ephemeral, seemingly unending struggle for effective co-ordination — that even that struggle could show positive results in the long run.

It had in fact learned to be optimistic — about the future, about its growing role in development, about the results of its work. The excitement which was there at the beginning was still there after 35 years.

Fighting Drought in Mozambique

Like many countries in Africa, Mozambique has suffered extensively from drought. The south-central part of that country comprising 5 million people — a third of its population — was afflicted beginning in 1982. The drought withered cereal crops and livestock, dried up wells and rivers and unloosed a vast migration of Mozambique's people. In the province of Inhambane, north of the capital, 100,000 people died in January and February 1983.

This disaster was compounded by internal armed conflict, which had destroyed an estimated 140 villages throughout the country and disrupted transport and communications. The Government was at odds as to how to reach the people, markets collapsed and starving farmers ate their crop seeds.

Fortunately, the UNDP/Government country programme for Mozambique (the third largest in Africa) paid special attention to the nation's extended coastline, the longest of any African country. The training of fishermen, merchant marine personnel, and water resource technicians generally had priority. When international emergency food relief began pouring into Maputo, the capital, the key problem was distribution to the drought-stricken hinterland. The Resident Representative chartered two large vessels to transfer supplies up the coast. Smaller craft were organized to relay foodstuffs to the hungry via inland waterways. Sweden joined the effort by donating trucks. Before civil conflict could intervene, further starvation was temporarily averted.

But as the drought persisted its effects spread. Water supplies for Maputo were threatened by the drying up of the Umbeluzi River. Again the Government turned to UNDP, which responded with an emergency grant of $30,000 to explore groundwater potentials, followed by $300,000 from the Secretary-General's Emergency Fund and another $2 million mobilized in bilateral aid. Together with France, Italy and the Netherlands, UNDP drew up a project plan, and within three months the first underground water resources were being tapped.

By the end of February 1984 drilling operations were complete — just in time. For only a month earlier, Maputo's river-water system had been dealt a final blow, this time, ironically, from cyclone "Demoina" which hurled destruction and torrential rains at the area parched by lack of water. More crops, livestock, villages and bridges collapsed in the wake of the cyclone, so that the cost of reconstruction overwhelmed the Government.

While Maputo survived, thanks to the effectiveness of the newly-bored groundwater wells, the UNDP Resident Representative again reached out to pool United Nations system resources for a broad programme of relief and rehabilitation. In March 1984, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, WHO, UNIDO, UNFPA and ILO joined in launching a campaign to gain additional support. They met with ambassadors from donor countries, circulated a newsletter and otherwise publicized the proposed programme, which embraced some 40 projects in six critical sectors. With its focus on food aid, nutrition, health and sanitation, the programme sought to orient emergency assistance to rehabilitation, the promotion of self-reliance and the renewal of self-confidence among a people severely tested by repeated disasters. Rehabilitation projects in agriculture and light industry replaced lost and destroyed tools, rebuilt local markets, repaired roads and bridges and restored groundwater sources where required.

A people who had fallen into lassitude and despair, growing only enough food for their own subsistence, are now being motivated to a renewed sense of life's normal needs and opportunities. The programme organized by UNDP and strongly supported by the Mozambique Government has won widespread international backing and participation from both other developing countries and traditional donors. UNDP field offices in other drought-stricken African countries are playing similarly active coordinating and mobilizing roles in meeting the emergency.

COUNTRY HISTORIES

In the relatively short history of international co-operation for development, there are nevertheless a great number of individual histories that could be recounted—for example, about:

- the millions of people in the developing world who have given shape, direction and energy to national economic and social advancement—peasants and prime ministers, engineers and extension workers, demographers and drillers, public works organizers and private-sector managers, macro-planners and micro-project staff;
- the tens of thousands of international staff who have contributed their "slices" of knowledge to development projects over the years—specialists in earth-resource sensing by satellite or echo-sounding for fish schools deep in oceans, trainers of teachers and designers of dams, meteorologists and mineralogists, UNDP Resident Representatives and United Nations Volunteers;
- the multiple methods— transferred and adapted, indigenous and revived, experimental and then widely replicated—which have been brought into play in the widest interdisciplinary human endeavor ever undertaken on this planet;
- the scores of countries which have struggled and survived in the post-colonial era, rediscovered cultural roots, promoted national unity, crafted their own development strategies, and sought to build up national self-reliance while also evolving anew international sharing of experience among themselves. Each such person, technique or country has its own story involving UNDP and predecessor organizations. For each there could be a reason to single it out, to describe its characteristics and chronology, and to explore its specific meaning.

This section presents four out of these countless possible stories, covering one country in each of the four main regions of the developing world: Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Algeria and Senegal.



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Racing Ahead

Systematic development efforts only started in the Dominican Republic after the death of its long-time head of state, Rafael Trujillo, in 1961. But once started development raced ahead with astonishing swiftness. Few poor countries have seen greater change or recorded more progress in so little time.

A small agrarian-based country of 6.3 million people, sharing the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean with Haiti, the Dominican Republic is the second most densely populated country in the Western Hemisphere. Successor Governments to Trujillo's were anxious to recoup lost ground and to strengthen links with the United Nations in particular. (Under Trujillo, over 2,000 fellowship offers from bilateral and multilateral sources alike had gone unused.)

EPTA assistance began on a contingency basis in 1962, and with the appointment of a Resident Representative a regular programme of co-operation began in 1963. Early projects reflected the basic, almost desperate level of needs from which the country was launching its development effort: survey of forest resources, veterinary training, public administration, statistics and census training, customs administration and tariff nomenclature, development of small- and medium scale industry, curriculum development, tuberculosis control.

Although the Government established a National Planning and Co-ordinating Board in 1962 (whose key officers in later years were trained through UNDP), it was not until recently that strong planning and central co-ordination had an important economic impact. During the years of greatest growth in the late 1960s and 1970s, when GNP jumped on average by more than 10 per cent a year, the major planning and direction of

development was carried out mainly by the Office of the President and the Central Bank. The country on its face has changed dramatically from a sleepy backwater to a thriving, sophisticated, middle-income developing country. But it shares the problems faced today by so many other developing countries — high inflation, low growth and debt restructuring — albeit with a solid base of human and physical resources for future growth and advancement.

The role of UNDP in all this has been and is financially modest. With project expenditures averaging less than $2 million a year, UNDP in 1984 accounted for less than 3 per cent of the Dominican Republic's net official development assistance. But UNDP assistance has been highly concentrated in key areas of human and institutional resource development and, beginning with the first EPTA programme in 1963-64, in those strategic areas identified by the Government as critical to the progress of a small, densely populated and agrarian island state. The strengthening of agriculture, education, Government planning and policy capacities, mining and light industry, export trade and tourism have been major areas of UNDP concentration. In each area there have been varied, often excellent, results with a significant catalytic impact.

Agriculture

Agriculture, the base of the Dominican economy, is a case in point. Over the years UNDP has supported four different projects designed to improve the sugar industry — a prime export and source of foreign exchange. Included is a recent project (1983) to utilize sugar cane by-products for the production of milk, meat, fertilizer and biogas. Meat is another export, and UNDP has supported seven different projects in poultry and livestock production, veterinary medicine, livestock census, the eradication of African swine fever and leather industry development.

Under a $1 million Special Fund project begun in 1969 and carried out by FAO, the Government sought to expand and diversify the production of basic food crops through a pilot scheme in the Cibao Valley. The project financed demonstration fields, seeds, equipment, research facilities and the training of a number of Dominicans in agricultural and animal sciences and of local farmers in new crops and techniques. A follow-up project in 1974 helped establish a centre for agricultural development near Santiago (called CENDA), which gathered the trained scientists into a research

laboratory aimed at increasing farm productivity, improving production systems and providing technical and extension support to the area's 300,000 small farmers.

The impact of CENDA's training and field demonstrations is now apparent throughout the Cibao area. The Centre itself estimates that banana production has doubled in the region, while maize output has jumped by 1,000 kilos per hectare. Sorghum and other disease-resistant seed varieties have been introduced to farmers with good results, and the country as a whole has become self-sufficient in rice, corn, sweet potato and beef production.

CENDA itself is now financed by Government and private sources, maintains a staff of 45 professional scientists in various fields, runs five extension stations and 20 demonstration fields and conducts numerous field days, observation tours, conferences and training courses each year. Parallel projects in irrigation and hydrology also helped support the quest for food diversification and self-sufficiency in the area. While health and other services have greatly improved for the region's small farmers, and their children are being educated, economic conditions remain difficult, mainly because of the small plots they work (about one hectare per farm) and the large families they support.

Exports

Success on a smaller scale has come from an export promotion project carried out by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It sought to identify agricultural products with export potential, introducing and adapting them for export and addressing questions of quality control, packing, pricing and marketing. The project has had success, first in introducing varieties of onions and garlic with export potential and later in extending such work to other fresh vegetables and emphasizing the off-season production of such crops. Based on these efforts a private Dominican/Mexican capital firm in 1983 invested $4 million in a plant for the processing of melons and cucumbers for off-season export to the U.S. market. The firm has prepared 500 hectares of land for crop production, installing irrigation infrastructure and a capacity to process 1,000 boxes (40 lbs.) each of melons and cucumbers per hour. Some 600 new jobs have resulted from this investment alone.

This export project had its roots in an earlier UNDP/UNIDO effort, started in 1976, to help establish indigenous raw material-based industries as foreign exchange earners. Drawing on personnel from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and three agricultural institutions, five Dominican professionals formed a working group to examine 58 ideas for agro-industrial expansion. They visited similar operations in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Guatemala to exchange experience and compile more ideas. As a result an Agro-Industrial Unit was created within the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, a National Programme of Agro-industrialization was launched, and Law 409 on Promotion, Incentives and Protection of Agro-industrial Enterprises was drawn up and adopted. These steps paved the way for the private Dominican/Mexican enterprise mentioned above.

Tourism

One sector which has proved remarkably successful in helping the Dominican Republic close the foreign exchange gap is tourism. UNDP has been involved from the start in a wide variety of ways: highway rehabilitation and maintenance, strengthening the Dominican port authority, development of civil aviation administration and support services and the establishment of a hotel training school. As early as 1969 a UNESCO study financed by UNDP had recognized the "great possibilities" and "enormous importance" of tourism development and urged steps to create incentives for foreign financing and strengthen tourism administration.

In 1971 UNDP followed up with the financing of a major feasibility study for the development of Puerto Plata on the north coast as a priority area for initial development. This massive study, carried out by the World Bank, proposed the initial construction of 1,900 hotel rooms together with supporting infrastructure — access highways, water supplies, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, golf courses, parks, worker housing, a terminal and supporting facilities for an international airport, a hotel training school and the establishment of a special tourism department (INFRATUR) within the Central Bank.

Any recent visitor to Puerto Plata can see the remarkable transformation that has taken place in 14 years. It received 600,000 foreign visitors in 1984, 85 per cent from Canada. Four hotels have been built by outside investors, providing 920 units to accommodate 2,148 visitors. Another 620 units are under construction and one new hotel a year is scheduled for future construction. With 8,840 new jobs already created and employment in the area rising by 15 per cent a year, Puerto Plata has already demonstrated the "great possibilities" prophesied in the 1969 study and its example is now being replicated at other, similarly favourable sites throughout the country.

From the virtual absence of visitors in the Trujillo era, the Dominican Republic has moved up to fifth place in the highly competitive Caribbean tourism market, with hotel capacity expanding since 1977 at the rate of 20.5 per cent a year. Between 1970 and 1980 alone, growth in Dominican tourism jumped by 377 per cent. With the sugar market depressed, other primary commodity exports under pressure, and the sharp rise in oil import costs, tourism development has literally proved a lifesaver of Dominican progress in the 1980s. In 1984, for the first time, tourism replaced sugar exports as the leading foreign exchange earner for the Dominican Republic, generating more than $300 million in income.



Education

An urgent priority of the Government has been education at all levels, and UNDP has helped through a variety of projects ranging from primary to post-graduate levels (see box). In the late 1970s help was given in establishing a National Institute for Technical/Vocational Training, to be sustained through employer and worker subscriptions, which would serve to narrow the critical gap in skilled and middle-level technicians. With follow-up World Bank and ILO assistance, the Institute by the end of 1983 had built a solid reputation for good "products," was self-sustaining and was training more than 8,000 workers in various fields a year.

Health care

With WHO as executing agency, UNDP has also helped make a major contribution to

improved health services. Under the "Oral Health Services and Training of Human Resources" project, fluoridation of water systems was accomplished, an extension service established, 1,865 health promoters trained as well as 303 odontology professionals, 5 technicians and 160 auxiliary personnel.

As early as 1963 UNDP became involved in one of Latin America's first rehabilitation centres for the handicapped. Initial support went for artificial limb replacement and physiotherapy, but later for the expansion of a broad rehabilitation programme which is now a model for the developing world. Today the Dominican Association for Rehabilitation, with central facilities in Santo Domingo and three regional programmes, is staffed by 300 personnel. They instruct 450 mentally retarded students, treat some 225 physically handicapped a day with the assistance of 11 consulting physicians, and run courses in physical therapy, psychology and nursing for five Dominican universities. Over the years, the Association has trained 300 specialized teachers of the handicapped, who serve throughout the country, and treated well over one million patients. Its modern facilities, including workshops for training in the construction of artificial limbs, are 45 per cent funded by the Government and the rest by tuition and fees. Long before the International Year of the Disabled, the Dominican Republic, with UNDP's support, was setting the pace for developing country assistance to the handicapped; its facilities are a major source of TCDC for other countries.

Current programme

Under UNDP's current, third country programme for the Dominican Republic, extending from 1982 through 1986, agriculture and renewable natural resources have been assigned top priority. In line with the Government's own development goals, these sectors are scheduled to absorb 40 to 50 per cent of the illustrative IPF. In agriculture, UNDP is participating in projects to assist in livestock research and land reform, with special emphasis on the needs of small farmers, and to improve existing irrigation systems and water resources.

Another priority is further strengthening of Government ministries, and particularly the National Planning Office and the National Statistical Office which UNDP helped to form in the past. A comprehensive project to strengthen the national planning system, develop a programme for more effective use of statistics (particularly census results), improve budgetary control and performance, establish an administrative career service and improve the co-ordination of external assistance is in process.

Elsewhere, UNDP support will be given in close co-operation with other bilateral and multilateral donors to the exploitation of untapped mineral resources — especially gold-bearing minerals and coal deposits — which previous mineral surveys have discovered in possibly commercial quantities. Toward those ends, UNDP is also helping expand the capacity of the analysis laboratory of the Department of Mines and Hydrocarbons.

Because hardly a sector of the Dominican economy has not been touched over the years by a catalytic input from UNDP, the Programme is in 1985 well regarded by Dominican authorities and widely commended for its work, however small compared to other major donors. As one former planning official said in an interview:
"UNDP's early contributon in training our cadre of planners alone makes the Programme outstanding. These were the best people we had and now they are in the most important positions in the country — in Government, running corporations, the telephone company, the Central Bank. While you could argue that the rate of return here on external assistance has been generally poor, the return on technical co-operation is less so. It has done the best job."

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Dominicans Teach Dominicans

On the outskirts of Santiago, the Dominican Republic's second largest city, the modern, neatly kept buildings of the Catholic University (Madre y Maestra) rise from the rolling hills. Founded in 1962, the fledgling University soon won UNDP/UNESCO support for its new mechanical and electrical engineering departments. At the time, there were only two degree-holding engineers in the entire Dominican Republic, and they each drove up from Santo Domingo to help part-time in the initial teaching. UNESCO assembled a distinguished multinational faculty, and helped prepare a thorough, high quality curriculum.

The early crop of engineering students took their last year of matriculation at qualified engineering schools in the United States. But today, because of the school's excellent reputation, none of the more than 100 graduates each year is any longer required to get "finishing" abroad. Some 96 per cent of these graduates themselves stay to work in the Dominican Republic.

Today also all of the engineering faculty at Madre y Maestra are Dominicans—80 per cent of them graduates of the school at which they now teach, 85 per cent of them full-time.

On a recent tour of the electrical and mechanical engineering laboratories, a visitor saw work benches and cupboards stocked with what looked like brand new equipment bearing the UNDP or UNESCO label. Said Renato Nuñez, Dean of Engineering and himself a graduate of Madre y Maestra, "It may look new, but it is almost 20 years old. We maintain it like new."

Provided almost 20 years ago under the original UNDP-financed project, these testing and quality control units "are stronger and better made than new models," says Mr. Nuñez. "They can be used for hands-on training by all the students without our being afraid some delicate part will be damaged. We know this equipment so well we can fix it ourselves. We even machine tool new parts when needed. It serves us very well."

Madre y Maestra's engineering departments are now reorganizing for the expanding needs of the country's development. A master's degree programme in electrical engineering will be introduced in 1987. A two and one-half year programme to turn out engineering technicians or associates is already graduating 160 students a year for middle-level technical needs. (University officials estimate that for every engineer graduated in the Dominican Republic, 10 such technicians or associates are also needed.) The Republic itself is now self-sufficient in electrical and mechanical engineers, though most still get higher degrees abroad and some foreign faculty are still employed in mining and computer fields. Madre y Maestra also has the distinction of producing one of the first woman engineering graduates in all of Latin America (1969)—a woman now serving as the University Dean of Admissions.

SRI LANKA: The Bedrock

Strong public and/or private institutions are the bedrock of self-reliance for developing countries. As much as a third of UNDP assistance in all regions has gone to support such institution building over the years.

In Sri Lanka, almost every research, training or planning institution has received assistance from UNDP or its predecessors at some stage of its development. In many cases the UNDP input has been major and crucial, particularly where the Programme has been involved from the very beginning, starting with pre-feasibility studies and planning stages right through to the establishment of a fully-functioning, self-reliant institution. In other cases UNDP has supported and strengthened existing institutions, adding to and expanding their research and training capacities. The types of institutions which have benefitted from UNDP assistance in Sri Lanka range from Government departments, state corporations, private sector undertakings, universities and schools of business management to primary schools, agricultural and rural training centres and grassroots non-governmental organizations in remote villages.



Bricks, priority and policy

Beyond their diversity, such projects in Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, have another signal feature: the Government, not UNDP, finances their bricks and mortar. This characteristic is crucial to understanding UNDP's role and why its success rate in institution building is so high. A Government such as Sri Lanka's approaches UNDP to support institution creation only when it has already firmly decided at a high level to accord the project high priority — a priority backed up by budgetary allocations for the required construction.

These projects also start with the vital advantage of a strong political commitment. Invariably it is a ministerial action, endorsed by the full cabinet, which approves a project. By contrast, many other externally-

supported institution-building projects come as package deals from the headquarters of a donor and are less firmly rooted in the Government's scale of priorities, financially and politically. Delays in project implementation for such "externally" conceived and designed projects in Sri Lanka are thus more serious than UNDP generally experiences.

A case in point is Sri Lanka's paramedical training institute which UNDP has been supporting with technical services since 1979. The Government's construction commitments were completed on time. However, a parallel programme at the same centre, financed by a bilateral donor including its large construction component, had yet to start by the end of 1984, although the donor's financing was approved at the same time as UNDP's five years before. Similarly, a technical training project financed by a bilateral donor was still awaiting the long-delayed completion of construction, while technical assistance personnel have been in post for several years with no building and no one to train.



Staying the course

Another characteristic feature of institution building projects: they are long-term. For example, a major institution in Sri Lanka fostered and developed by UNDP is the University of Moratuwa. This institution started out in the 1960s in a small structure in the middle of a field on the outskirts of the capital, Colombo. There, a few young apprentice men and women began getting practical technical training in general engineering disciplines. With strong support from the Government and almost continuous assistance from UNDP through UNESCO from 1966 to 1981, this centre developed through successive stages to become first the Ceylon College of Technology. In 1973 it became a faculty of the University of Ceylon (the "Kattubedde Campus," as it was called) and finally, in 1979, it received its own charter as a full-fledged University of Engineering.

UNDP's expenditure over this 15-year period was a relatively modest $3.8 million. This sum paid for 34 technical co-operation personnel in various disciplines, 46 overseas fellowships for faculty staff and a substantial quantity of laboratory, workshop and classroom equipment for training purposes. Its evolution through three successive projects shows that despite the disfavour often expressed in development circles for "long-duration" projects, an organization such as UNDP must be prepared and able to help over an extended period, in order to achieve durable and significant results. Today, the University of Moratuwa is the only technical university in Sri Lanka. It has a leadership role in industrial development as well as in promoting greater use of science and technology in the country.

Successful institution building with extended UNDP assistance is illustrated by numerous other projects in Sri Lanka.

UNDP commenced support to the newly established Management Development and Productivity Centre in 1968. After 13 years of continuous UNDP assistance through ILO, the centre has now become the National Institute of Business Management. Income from its training and consultancy services covers all running costs, making the institute virtually self-financing. It has over 60 qualified professional staff and a total staff of 140. Its own five-storied building, constructed by the Government, has lecture halls, conference rooms, an air-conditioned auditorium, library and canteen services. UNDP's inputs over the period consisted of advisory/expert services, training of national staff, overseas fellowships for higher learning and equipment support —all for a total cost of $2.4 million.
cost of $2.4 million.

Ranging from statistics to health and more still, other UNDP-supported projects have helped launch and build the institutional base for many vital endeavours:

- the Hotel Training School, which provides the personnel foundation for the rapidly expanding tourist industry;
- the National Institute of Health Sciences, training para-medical personnel for primary health care programmes;
- the Department of Census and Statistics, which has completed a population, an agricultural and an industrial census in three successive years, on time;
- the National Water Supply and Drainage Board, which has embarked on a major drive to reach the targets of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade — safe water and adequate sanitation for all Sri Lankans;
- the Urban Development Authority, molded from scratch within six years to become one of Asia's premier urban planning and development organizations;
- Open University of Sri Lanka, which from a modest start in 1980 already enrolls over 12,000 students annually — more than double the intake of the six other traditional universities combined;
- the Soyabean Programme, which has brought both public and private sector undertakings from a zero-production base in 1974 to a 30,000-tons-per-year industry in 1984.

As national priorities evolve and completed institution-building projects conclude, UNDP financial resources are committed for developing other needed planning, training and service structures. In Sri Lanka, the Programme is presently engaged in supporting new institution-building projects in fields such as telecommunications, civil aviation, plantation management, water management, settlement planning, rainfed-rice research and horticulture.

ALGERIA: Independence...Training...Sharing...



In the early 1960s, independence came in a climactic rush to many developing countries, as colonial flags fluttered down all over the world. Few newly independent nations faced more severe problems than Algeria, which gained nationhood in 1962 after a bitter struggle. The colonists had commanded the upper heights of the nation's economy, and when many of them departed, Algeria was left with a dearth of trained professional and technical personnel to fill the gap.

For example, there were no trained Algerian meteorologists, hydraulic or telecommunications engineers. There were only six national mechanical or electrical engineers in the whole country, and they had been trained abroad. At every level — technicians, administrators, statisticians — there was sudden and urgent demand for trained nationals to succeed or replace the colonists.

From the onset the new Government attached key importance to training, an emphasis reflected in early EPTA and Special Fund programming. The first projects approved under the Special Fund were for training of mechanical and electrical engineers and of telecommunications specialists, to which the Special Fund contributed $3.4 million and the Algerian Government $12.9 million.

Projects "Algeria One and Two," as they were called — assistance to the Ecole Nationale Polytechnique — laid the basis for self-reliance in electrical and mechanical engineering. Today a cadre of more than 3,000 such engineers have been graduated into the work force. One graduate is now a Government minister, another is Deputy President of the Assembly. All of the teachers in the field are now Algerian trained, the original UNESCO-recruited instructors having moved on years ago, their mission accomplished. Indeed, the Polytechnique is currently awarding doctorates in mechanical and electrical engineering and the total of 30 graduate level degrees a year is scheduled to rise to 100 a year by 1989. Moreover it has spun off four other national engineering schools, also staffed with Algerian graduates. About 7 per cent of the Polytechnique's students are from other developing countries in Africa and the Arab region.

Telecommunications — a critical and highly sensitive sector for any newly independent country — was left totally bereft of higher level personnel in 1962, and a new generation of foreign expertise was imported to tide Algeria over to self-reliance. With ITU as executing agency, UNDP assistance began in 1964 with the establishment of the Ecole Nationale d'Etudes des Télécommunications. In its first nine years the school trained 800 technicians and senior level professionals. By 1974 Algeria had achieved self-sufficiency in telecommunications expertise and had fully replaced its old, outdated network with new equipment. As with the Polytechnique, successive phases of UNDP assistance progressed to new and higher levels of development and training, including post-graduate work. By 1984 the telecommunications centre in Oran had trained 2,460 technicians, including 65 conceptual design (post-graduate) engineers, 540 graduate engineers, 1,490 technicians and senior technicians and 365 upgraded personnel. Of these, 120 were from other developing countries.

These outstanding successes were widely replicated in other areas. UNDP, with WMO execution, helped found and finance meteorology training in Algeria from the outset, and the first student to enter the Institute of Hydrometeorology in Oran became its director 10 years later. Before 1970 all meteorologists in the country had been trained in France. Now more than 270 have been trained in Algeria and provide the nation's meteorological expertise in hydrology, aeronautical forecasting, agriculture, energy, marine, industrial and pollution control applications.

Similarly, vocational training was virtually



non-existent in Algeria prior to independence. With some UNDP/ILO assistance to a major Government effort, about 100,000 apprentices are now being trained a year in 120 fields of vocational specialization, with only marginal dependence on outside skills remaining. With UNESCO, UNDP has also helped lay the basis for Algerian expertise in planning and statistics with assistance to a professional training institute within the Ministry of Planning whose cadre today is essentially comprised of Algerian personnel. In 10 years the Institute has graduated 840 trainees, half in statistics and half in planning. They now staff not only key ministries and regional Government offices but also instruct new trainees in the Institute itself. This project has also moved to a higher, post-graduate level of training and is accepting a growing number of African students in the spirit of TCDC.

Though a basic goal of technical co-operation, training is never so easy or successful as the above record in Algeria might indicate. Finding appropriate, qualified and dedicated international experts, particularly at the higher levels, can be time-consuming. Persuading them to serve can be more arduous still. Supplying the right equipment, even keeping trainers in their jobs once trained, can prove difficult. Algeria has made an especially strenuous effort to overcome these ubiquitous problems, with good results. It has stressed a carefully prepared welcoming structure for foreign teachers, including good quality national staff in place on their arrival. It has stressed the training of effective Algerian trainers, so that dependence on outside expertise could be phased out. And it has seen to it both that the training institutions themselves receive strong Government support and that the teachers they produce are well paid in comparison to their operational sectors of expertise.

Today Algeria is totally committed to sharing its training advances with other developing countries. Almost one per cent of its own GNP now goes for external assistance —some $300 million a year, mostly to neighbouring Africa and Arab States. And because Algeria's own experience with and early reliance on multilateral assistance has proved effective and beneficial, the nation is determined to work closely with multilateral programmes in its own expanding external assistance activities. Algeria is a country closing the circle from recipient to beneficiary to donor, and the helping-hand so effectively extended in its own troubled days of post-independence continues to figure prominently in its policies toward the future.

SENEGAL: "To Build, To Achieve"

"Our common design, our common objective? To build, to achieve ... through mutual assistance."
Representative of Senegal to UNDP Governing Council, 1968

Although Senegal in West Africa is roughly equivalent in size of population to the Dominican Republic, its considerably smaller gross national product entitles it under the IPF system to more than double the amount of UNDP allocation. Even so, however, Senegal's strategic place as a crossroads in West Africa, its position as one of the world's least developed countries and its repeated suffering over the past decade from severe drought have drawn sizeable offerings of international support from numerous donors, so that UNDP's own enhanced assistance volume is no more than



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about 2 per cent of total ODA flows.

What makes Senegal particularly different from the Dominican Republic and most other recipients, however, is the heavy concentration of regional projects and programmes, by both UNDP and other donors, from which it benefits. Some maintain that, over the years since its independence in 1960, Senegal has benefitted more from UNDP-supported regional and sub-regional programming than directly from its own country IPF.

Regional co-operation

Of a hundred or more such African regional projects, several have had especially strong impact on Senegal's development. Foremost in its potential benefit is the co-operative effort of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, begun in 1963, for the development of the Senegal River Basin. EPTA regional assistance began in 1964 and has continued through the Special Fund and UNDP to the two regional projects costing $3.3 million currently under way.

The main water source in a semi-arid region inhabited by 2.5 million people, the Senegal River stretches for 1,800 kilometres and embraces 290,000 square kilometres in its catchment. Its rich potential in an area plagued by drought and food deficits drew the three countries through which it mainly flows to create an inter-governmental institution now known as "Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal" (OMVS).

Through a comprehensive, integrated approach OMVS has sought regional co-operation to speed the environmentally sound development of the basin and its adjacent areas. And UNDP has helped with an array of sectoral surveys for regulating the river by means of multi-purpose dams (for flood and salinity control and hydropower generation), for navigable waterways and the construction of fluvial harbours, for irrigated agriculture and for agronomic research (see map).

In 1976 the first phase of the OMVS programme began with plans for a massive hydro-electric dam at Manantali in Mali with a storage capacity of 10,000 million cubic metres of water. It would help to control the flow of the river, irrigate some 400,000 hectares, generate 800 megawatts of power and afford permanent navigation from the Senegal coast to Kayes in Mali. In addition, an anti-salt dam was planned near the mouth of the river to prevent upstream motion of salt water at low-flow periods and at the same time to store water for the irrigation of up to 60,000 additional acres. Finally, a river port was planned at Kayes, Mali, together with other intermediate ports and an improved navigation channel.

This programme will open the door to substantially increased agricultural production and industrial development, facilitating the transport of bauxite and iron mined upriver and the shipment of agricultural raw materials. Construction work began in 1981 and will continue for 50 years at a projected cost of $2 billion.

UNDP has played a formative role in Senegal River Basin development almost from the start and has been especially instrumental in providing institutional support to OMVS and in helping to mobilize the vast resources required for the river basin's development. By mid-1982, some $822 million had been raised from a broad range of donors including Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Iraq, Italy, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, the African Development Bank, the European Development Fund, the Islamic Development Bank and, of course, the riparian states themselves. The scheme has not only drawn unprecedented levels of international co-operation; it gives hope for a better future to the drought-stricken peoples of the three countries combined. No single country project can be expected to have greater long-term impact on Senegal's own development prospects.

Senegal benefits from a number of other regional projects, including:

- a joint programme with Gambia and Guinea for development of the Gambia River Basin, an area of 78,000 square kilometres encompassing 800,000 people and $260 million in projected development assistance;
- the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), whose 15-country efforts include a regional station in Senegal to identify and introduce high-yielding rice varieties suitable to the area;
- two regional facilities designed to strengthen the training of personnel in the maritime transport sector;
- a regional centre for labour administration (CRADAT) to train middle and high-level labour administrators and social security officers in francophone countries;
- an advanced telecommunications school located in Senegal and serving the needs of eight other West and Central African countries;
- support for a Pan-African Telecom-

munications network which has already mobilized $108 million for linking 38 African countries in a common communications framework;

- a wildlife training school, now well established, to build a cadre for the protection of wildlife in francophone countries; and
- a programme to immunize all children of the region against diphtheria, measles, poliomyelitis, tetanus, tuberculosis and whooping cough by 1990.

Cutting its own path

When Senegal gained independence in August 1960 it faced the severe problems of an undeveloped colonial country with an undiversified, one-crop economy (groundnuts) and few trained human resources for cutting an independent path to progress. From the start UNDP concentrated on training and the development of human resources and worked with persistence, if not always with success, on means of diversifying economic activity. So great were the needs in the early years of independence that UNDP's limited inputs were inevitably spread thinly, and it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the Programme gained focus and began to show an important impact.

Nonetheless, the Programme performed valuable service to Senegal in its immediate post-independence days. The earliest projects were invariably of the kind that lay the long-term foundations for development and are not expected to have immediate impact — for example, mineral resource surveys, survey and development of pelagic fish resources, fishing technology, the Institute of Food Technology, labour statistics, co-operative development, nutrition education, rural vocational training, and establishment of a master plan for water supply and sewerage for Dakar, the capital, and surrounding areas. These are the kinds of basic studies and capacities which UNDP helped establish for almost every newly-independent country in the uncertain years after nationhood (see Algeria country history). If nothing else, they provided new governments with a more detailed understanding of what the country had to work with and the problems that had to be faced.

By the late 1960s, UNDP programming was focusing in more sharply on the most critical problem — the development of Senegal's human resources. Two important projects of many in this area are illustrative of both the success and the difficulties encountered.

The idea behind the first project — the National Society for Industrial Studies and Promotion (SONEPI) — was to encourage the entrepreneurial spirit and strengthen middle-level technical expertise. It did this, starting in 1970 with UNDP/UNIDO support, by establishing industrial estates for small-scale wood, metal, leather and other workshops. Proved widely successful in other developing countries in Africa, this

method is still considered a key to small-scale industrial development in Senegal. Each year 20 or more workshop technicians are trained in order to set up business in the estates. The original Dakar estates are now being expanded with bilateral assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany. Meanwhile, UNDP/UNIDO have sought to extend the base network to other, depressed areas of the country, less by establishing new estates than by extending local expertise and workshops already functioning successfully in Dakar.

Among the difficulties the project faced are that the workshops themselves were initially built on too large a scale, and the entrepreneurs in charge have had trouble in maintaining them. Progress has also been inhibited by lack of adequate electricity supplies, technical back-up and support services (credit, for example, has not been forthcoming in this hard-pressed country). And transport has been a problem: it is less costly to move essential equipment from France to Dakar than from Dakar to some outlying regions. Nonetheless, the project is having its intended results. New internationally-recruited experts assigned to the provinces are helping to bolster technical support (Senegal's continuing dependence on outside expertise remains a problem of concern). And the Government itself is providing more back-up to an effort which is gaining priority treatment.

International expertise was also heavily invested from the inception of the second project, for the Bureau of Organization and Methods (BOM). It was established in 1969 with UNDP assistance through the United Nations Department of Technical Co-operation for Development. Today it thrives with only one international expert remaining. As in other newly independent countries, Senegal faced overwhelming administrative and organizational problems following independence, problems compounded by a rapidly swelling number of new civil servants barely trained for their tasks. BOM was established directly under the President, initially to restructure ministries and streamline administration. Subsequently it also worked to upgrade top, middle and lower-level civil servants, reform the country's regional administration, establish sound personnel policies and procedures and train managers of public enterprises (parastatals).

The project's impact has been exceptional in many ways. For example, BOM has:

- analyzed administrative costs, leading to a Salary Control Commission which substantially reduced public sector costs;
- reorganized 10 mixed-economy companies and put them on a sounder footing;
- extended its system of management information throughout the Government and tied it into the Pan-African Information Agency;

- provided strong support to West Africa's leading school of management, the African Training Centre in Administration for Development, which is headed by a former BOM trainee;
- been directly advising the President on Government organization and operations;
- produced trainees, many of whom studied abroad under UNDP-supported fellowships, who now staff the upper echelons of Senegal's Government and business — three are ministers (labour, commerce and tourism) and 12 are managers of public enterprises or directors of departments.

The current Minister of Labour has said that "Real administrative reform is not a matter of charts and tables of organization. It means solving management problems, and this is BOM's great contribution." BOM has also attracted attention outside the country, where its structure has been replicated, with UNDP support, in Togo and Mauritania.

There has also been positive impact in other sectors, such as:

Telecommunications

A "twinning" arrangement of the kind advocated in New Dimensions has been established between Senegal's Office of Posts and Telecommunications and the Neuchatel district of Switzerland's telecommunications service. It provides an inexpensive channel for continuous Swiss expertise and advice in updating Senegal's master plan for telecommunications development. The cost to UNDP for missions and training: $23,000.

Soil conservation

With FAO as executing agency, UNDP has helped develop innovative sand dune stabilization techniques which have restored and protected market gardening along Senegal's maritime coast. Two hundred kilometres of forest windbreaks have been planted along the sea between St. Louis and Dakar. Dunes stretching inland from the sea are being intensively planted with trees especially capable of holding the soil. Market gardening in the area continues to thrive, despite drought, with handpumps made in Mali under another UNDP-assisted project in use for groundwater supplies. The entire project has attracted $10 million in U.S. and Canadian assistance for parallel or direct follow-on projects, and an $800,000 allocation from Norway for the tree planting brigade.

Two sectors in Senegal's economy have taken on particularly critical importance in the wake of the drought/debt disaster facing so many African countries — tourism and foreign trade.

Tourism

Ironically, in the early 1970s when the Senegalese Government sought energetically to develop the country's considerable tourism potential (beautiful, unspoiled beaches, wildlife, etc.), UNDP initially advised against it. There was, and remains in

some quarters, a view that tourism development distorts balanced growth, requires heavy initial investments and high levels of imports to satisfy tourist needs and provides low-rates of overall return compared to other sectors. (In 1978, for example, the World Bank halted all further loans for tourism development.) It was UNDP's view, expressed to the Government, that scarce resources could be more profitably applied elsewhere.

Fortunately, the Government, which is ultimate master of its own programme under the UNDP mandate, prevailed. Fortunately, also, the initial tourism development project begun in 1970 attracted a first-rate, highly experienced United Nations expert in the field, whose recommendations have since yielded spectacular results. Today heavily booked hotels dot the Senegalese coast, with further development continuing rapidly on the Petit Côte. Tourism, as in the Dominican Republic, has become the primary provider of foreign exchange.

Trade promotion

By contrast, trade promotion, also begun in 1970, got off to a more difficult start — the key expert devoted his main energies to developing trade ties with a small European country. Under subsequent projects aimed particularly at increasing Senegal's trade with its West African neighbours, however, results have been substantial. Senegal's share in that regional trade has jumped from $16 million to **$70 million** in the past five years.

Senegal's current (third) country programme (1983-1986) is closely aligned with the Government's own Sixth National Plan and concentrates in order of priority, on food self-sufficiency, water control, energy, tourism and fisheries. From a programme which was scattered and thinly spread in the early years, UNDP has moved toward greater concentration on the country's most critical needs as seen by the Government itself.

A glance through the UNDP archives in Senegal shows that UNDP and its field representatives learned from their early difficulties and improved their capabilities to serve as the country progressed. Early project correspondence is replete with complaints of missing or late experts, counterparts moving at mid-project to other assignments, undelivered equipment, delayed fellowships. Second-guessing of the Government also proved a hazardous preoccupation in those early years. With improved policies and streamlined procedures, such difficulties are now less frequent, though they have not disappeared. Thirty-five years of Programme-wide experience have brought UNDP and Senegal into an effective and highly valued working relationship.

COUNTRY FACTS

UNDP is, without doubt, the world's most extensive "market" of currencies, skills, supplies and services. By 1985, on its 35th anniversary, it had:

- **received voluntary contributions totalling $8.5 billion from 180 countries and territories, developed and developing alike;**
- **assigned some 180,000 experts of 164 nationalities to work in almost every sector in 170 countries and territories;**
- **provided fellowships to over 135,000 people for study in 169 countries and territories;**
- **procured project equipment worth over $1.2 billion in 175 countries and territories;**
- **awarded subcontracts worth over $885 million for services from 136 countries and territories.**

The tables on the following pages list major components in the participation of all countries and territories—donors and recipients—in the Programme since its inception.

"Co-operation under the United Nations banner between these experts from many countries and local experts and personnel constitutes an invaluable, dynamic asset that must be preserved and made increasingly fruitful.

Representative of Venezuela, 1981

"Despite our different approaches and perceptions, and the continued presence of a vast expanse of poverty, the developed and developing countries form a community. Whether rich or poor we share a common overriding interest in promoting prosperity, peace and well-being. To this ideal, UNDP gives daily practical expression."

Ambassador of Bangladesh and Chairman, Group of 77

"As an aid institution, the UNDP enjoys unique advantages. The depth and breadth of know-how available through this Programme make it a very valuable source of expertise to developing countries. Moreover, the opportunity to learn from the experiences of other developing countries through this Programme is in itself of considerable benefit."

Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1984

COUNTRY OR TERRITORY	TOTAL VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION US$000	PROJECT EXPENDITURE US$000	BY NATIONALITY OF EXPERT OR FELLOW		BY COUNTRY RECEIVING ASSISTANCE		BY SUPPLIER[3]	
			NO. OF EXPERTS[1]	NO. OF FELLOWSHIPS	NO. OF EXPERTS	NO. OF FELLOWSHIPS[2]	EQUIPMENT US$000	SUBCONTRACTS US$000
AFGHANISTAN	1 977	107 743	72	3 334	2 609	63	834	97
ALBANIA	123	5 792	—	312	40	—	1	—
ALGERIA	9 285	82 209	151	1 344	2 438	315	113	23
ANGOLA	34	27 650	7	322	347	17	319	—
ANGUILLA	—	3	—	3	2	—	—	—
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	118	3 648	—	90	132	55	53	—
ARGENTINA	22 601	76 271	1 356	1 697	1 888	3 189	1 215	2 991
AUSTRALIA	116 139	—	3 948	37	139	2 081	10 406	14 057
AUSTRIA	66 993	252	1 285	88	58	1 087	20 569	8 296
BAHAMAS	351	6 566	—	128	188	10	61	—
BAHRAIN	499	12 936	3	1 344	279	9	84	108
BANGLADESH	1 315	151 236	304	1 982	1 677	283	2 147	3 236
BARBADOS	296	6 840	52	206	279	178	122	101
BELGIUM	175 804	—	5 480	5	1	2 143	9 779	13 879
BELIZE (BRITISH HONDURAS)	135	3 383	—	87	129	1	2	—
BENIN (DAHOMEY)	38	49 673	170	622	765	78	2 825	344
BERMUDA	58	836	1	—	23	4	92	—
BHUTAN	36	25 649	—	525	201	3	562	—
BOLIVIA	1 497	59 705	637	40	1 693	1 060	1 242	706
BOTSWANA (BECHUANALAND)	215	25 655	1	106	592	352	808	50
BRAZIL	36 187	137 942	1 332	1 743	3 315	1 864	1 030	2 864
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS	38	978	4	16	18	1	—	—
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	7	316	—	34	16	21	3	—
BULGARIA	6 704	21 872	513	2 096	318	443	188	29
BURKINA FASO (UPPER VOLTA)	81	62 064	49	760	945	124	2 657	2 779
BURMA	8 074	96 887	148	1 666	1 874	332	1 566	10
BURUNDI	355	64 689	12	552	1 087	48	1 931	341
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REP.	4 956	—	17	—	—	36	—	—
CANADA	470 693	—	5 658	—	—	2 973	25 436	56 080
CAPE VERDE	42	9 515	1	166	136	10	186	—
CAYMAN ISLANDS	117	1 658	2	88	52	—	—	—
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	44	35 847	15	452	626	94	962	45
CHAD	89	36 602	12	1 032	579	260	1 940	1 050
CHILE	8 480	77 841	3 473	1 738	2 086	1 693	1 130	4 936
COLOMBIA	14 811	81 214	1 412	1 701	2 136	714	1 829	8 827

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COMOROS	1	12 732	—	48	122	2	638	472
CONGO (DEM REP/BRAZZAVILLE)	105	32 957	32	537	638	77	1 478	169
COOK ISLANDS	150	3 498	—	77	65	6	19	--
COSTA RICA	1 417	21 874	439	654	729	707	559	1 865
CUBA	6 397	43 963	266	753	585	73	492	183
CYPRUS	1 087	20 748	188	246	746	183	412	--
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	14 135	8 586	1 821	1 021	162	781	1 534	9 386
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (CAMBODIA)	305	46 241	31	433	395	85	93	30
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REP. OF KOREA	776	7 828	6	123	46	24	53	—
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN (ADEN)	46	39 669	12	727	727	10	581	8
DENMARK	713 470	—	2 727	3	3	4 677	18 799	14 268
DJIBOUTI	10	4 353	6	70	25	1	72	—
DOMINICA	257	3 436	4	55	92	1	55	—
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1 201	31 944	79	443	904	79	826	—
ECUADOR	5 911	59 763	661	1 240	1 862	271	1 569	202
EL SALVADOR	1 513	29 807	191	779	884	102	851	78
EGYPT (UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC)	13 055	123 936	3 377	1 829	2 584	2 990	1 318	2 707
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	18	12 496	2	79	270	—	220	10
ETHIOPIA	2 636	124 526	265	1 527	2 418	1 198	3 059	83
FIJI	504	15 665	31	329	531	556	1 411	561
FINLAND	92 784	392	1 247	187	11	666	2 618	4 326
FRANCE	268 731	—	20 318	53	102	13 643	84 252	87 088
GABON	1 629	35 250	—	208	576	46	632	92
GAMBIA	75	17 143	28	264	343	30	487	—
GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	8 975	—	107	—	—	204	2 026	2 251
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF	266 513	—	6 193	4	2	6 984	116 456	38 036
GHANA	5 355	68 830	362	983	1 307	330	680	277
GREECE	10 933	27 796	623	1 380	1 145	351	439	1 196
GRENADA	136	3 928	5	61	42	25	3	—
GUATEMALA	2 060	32 574	296	612	908	143	709	108
GUINEA	303	70 855	31	941	797	10	777	318
GUINEA-BISSAU	3	17 006	—	226	225	38	424	—
GUYANA	2 166	20 525	167	337	588	49	236	2
HAITI	74	53 716	747	539	1 180	44	1 489	218
HOLY SEE	44	—	—	—	—	—	—	--
HONDURAS	557	36 984	97	652	910	108	1 234	344

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HUNGARY	6 915	16 289	1 211	1 656	401	685	1 156	3 355
ICELAND	1 738	1 892	362	64	106	17	3	55
INDIA	117 073	311 615	8 648	7 055	4 754	5 962	8 301	22 246
INDONESIA	20 391	174 764	388	4 460	4 273	852	3 906	3 810
IRAN	28 410	84 921	216	1 684	3 562	344	1 720	5 861
IRAQ	8 584	57 275	339	1 318	1 942	117	408	—
IRELAND	11 253	887	881	7	22	394	409	1 154
ISRAEL	2 602	14 894	1 737	1 162	713	625	711	8 471
ITALY	155 165	168	4 650	21	32	7 762	44 943	38 627
IVORY COAST	2 450	77 036	31	532	1 325	574	1 619	704
JAMAICA	1 495	32 540	256	429	790	457	963	131
JAPAN	419 492	1 597	2 460	608	80	2 703	108 034	27 322
JORDAN	2 712	54 265	758	1 709	1 302	166	939	13
KENYA	2 699	79 651	188	1 164	1 671	1 181	5 253	18 024
KIRIBATI	63	2 335	—	77	57	14	3	—
KUWAIT	8 940	13 748	4	169	293	59	380	157
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	517	45 701	39	647	766	7	1 297	—
LEBANON	2 736	30 642	605	711	1 008	1 862	1 428	5 776
LESOTHO (BASUTOLAND)	439	35 349	19	360	709	59	1 142	500
LIBERIA	2 129	35 792	23	577	988	106	1 522	75
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	9 515	40 741	11	846	1 547	287	147	—
LIECHTENSTEIN	—	—	—	37	—	—	568	—
LUXEMBOURG	1 390	10	69	2	12	193	7	182
MADAGASCAR	2 644	62 879	101	737	1 087	97	2 005	1 030
MALAWI	313	54 190	20	906	815	298	1 901	267
MALAYSIA	3 850	54 590	249	1 431	1 638	1 195	1 037	2 192
MALDIVES	24	8 028	—	261	148	5	316	54
MALI	355	82 489	201	1 290	1 213	391	4 252	1 488
MALTA	559	4 783	45	98	361	63	18	311
MAURITANIA	518	32 156	29	673	519	30	747	182
MAURITIUS	634	18 362	125	387	440	116	604	86
MEXICO	17 789	78 840	831	843	1 919	1 639	1 223	19 596
MONACO	106	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MONGOLIA	1 634	48 973	—	474	347	45	320	—
MONSERRAT	82	1 071	—	56	19	2	1	—

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MOROCCO	4 856	75 277	145	822	2 189	774	909	502
MOZAMBIQUE	160	48 401	4	112	522	86	1 888	116
MULTI-ISLAND COUNTRY PROJECTS	—	12 837	—	1	181	—	95	178
NAMIBIA	—	9 301	2	180	24	—	102	—
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS	—	15 909	1	1 217	31	—	118	—
NAURU	1	15	—	—	—	—	—	—
NEPAL	626	99 678	294	2 413	1 711	74	2 465	835
NETHERLANDS	735 056	—	6 786	19	7	4 323	25 952	21 085
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES	—	7 492	3	112	176	36	47	—
NEW CALEDONIA	—	250	—	10	7	53	18	125
NEW ZEALAND	24 873	—	2 011	69	1	638	1 124	6 272
NICARAGUA	733	25 799	85	471	701	59	836	413
NIGER	294	58 943	23	826	1 198	528	1 886	1 005
NIGERIA	10 188	143 592	229	1 544	3 131	423	1 812	4 016
NIUE	10	1 363	—	29	26	2	7	26
NORWAY	396 759	—	2 146	2	—	754	10 526	18 170
OMAN	872	14 635	—	134	276	24	36	52
PAKISTAN	26 327	147 201	1 752	2 736	3 066	478	2 336	2 287
PANAMA	4 026	35 681	154	605	1 057	223	1 015	530
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	1 290	22 201	3	1 247	431	234	281	5
PARAGUAY	904	32 649	138	659	956	95	498	759
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA	15 782	79 597	76	1 661	191	242	394	1 753
PERU	7 296	66 711	1 572	977	1 034	401	2 518	406
PHILIPPINES	15 328	90 425	1 649	2 488	2 052	2 566	3 190	13 027
POLAND	15 269	25 555	2 094	2 958	310	681	1 667	3 490
PORTUGAL	1 236	6 441	745	592	248	337	451	2 397
PUERTO RICO	—	23	34	13	5	427	—	10
QATAR	2 400	4 235	1	38	252	36	79	—
REPUBLIC OF CHINA	1 078	17 764	424	748	460	112	6	—
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	9 253	59 287	299	1 363	802	267	309	1 193
ROMANIA	7 540	28 983	496	1 391	570	346	539	311
RWANDA	167	60 280	16	566	45	19	2 639	361
SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS	85	2 229	—	96	86	4	8	—
SAINT LUCIA	139	3 707	3	151	65	74	28	—
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	155	3 089	5	78	51	34	16	13

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SAMOA	25	14 550	6	318	379	53	377	7
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1	3 237	3	51	56	2	6	—
SAUDI ARABIA	35 096	63 227	23	477	1 385	51	377	489
SENEGAL	2 168	51 125	263	915	1 199	1 573	4 896	1 463
SEYCHELLES	7	3 264	7	104	82	—	27	—
SIERRA LEONE	1 271	41 328	108	622	751	43	807	94
SINGAPORE	2 510	27 220	66	653	744	2 029	7 782	830
SOLOMON ISLANDS	111	7 302	1	104	164	54	145	—
SOMALIA	66	79 450	24	859	1 587	20	423	502
SOUTH AFRICA	—	—	224	153	—	19	586	—
SPAIN	16 283	10 107	2 314	443	621	1 667	5 023	5 789
SRI LANKA (CEYLON)	7 051	88 170	1 145	2 329	1 900	787	1 770	765
SUDAN	3 473	104 304	633	1 750	1 988	360	1 684	133
SURINAME	517	8 259	4	87	234	12	69	—
SWAZILAND	142	18 927	5	380	602	179	2 115	7
SWEDEN	729 117	—	4 625	2	3	2 985	31 876	10 391
SWITZERLAND	117 631	—	3 303	13	34	5 194	65 324	18 933
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	2 392	53 281	725	1 121	1 554	128	556	760
TERRITORY OF HONG KONG	115	1 368	8	195	55	193	7 408	400
THAILAND	14 233	86 950	858	2 566	2 672	3 474	12 211	2 723
TOGO	1 296	38 551	79	758	703	151	1 241	176
TOKELAU	—	530	—	11	—	—	—	—
TONGA	36	4 665	20	154	127	15	22	459
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	2 346	25 052	219	292	629	338	617	60
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	—	2 124	—	61	70	—	3	—
TUNISIA	4 400	61 733	581	1 427	1 696	881	811	510
TURKEY	21 706	95 526	662	3 592	2 534	694	361	140
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	63	1 117	—	99	18	—	17	—
TUVALU	—	1 553	—	47	12	1	19	11
UGANDA	467	70 832	136	1 118	1 184	429	1 433	259
UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC	11 327	—	16	1	—	146	—	—
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	86 666	—	3 154	7	—	3 668	10 034	9 530
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	10 609	13 918	6	26	216	14	227	—
UNITED KINGDOM	565 758	—	27 027	340	23	18 595	184 972	103 806
UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	135	57 840	106	736	1 103	714	1 631	642

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UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	1 615	106 605	119	1 845	2 003	1 049	2 847	240
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	2 309 094	—	20 473	7	5	21 261	341 502	178 595
URUGUAY	6 982	35 415	957	784	872	110	594	121
VANUATU	25	3 728	—	55	79	5	48	—
VENEZUELA	30 646	51 923	332	816	1 554	493	516	2 073
VIET NAM	684	79 275	313	719	444	68	589	50
WEST INDIES	—	270	2	26	72	18	85	8
YEMEN	96	88 680	18	1 049	1 386	43	818	434
YUGOSLAVIA	28 588	39 370	2 762	60701	1 642	781	378	3 849
ZAIRE	4 489	96 987	77	946	1 736	147	1 320	334
ZAMBIA	2 376	51 794	31	479	1 301	505	1 406	885
ZIMBABWE (SOUTHERN RHODESIA)	222	10 487	65	119	119	48	486	343
COUNTRY SUB-TOTAL:	8 519 641	6 660 560	183 660	135 241	140 851	165 689	1 243 110	871 934
INTERCOUNTRY								
AFRICA REGIONAL	—	302 606	2	152	1 720	—	12 417	—
ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONAL	—	246 150	—	996	1 800	—	—	—
LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL	—	203 813	11	17	2 830	—	48	—
ARAB STATES REGIONAL[5]	—	45 182	—	8	616	—	31	—
EUROPE REGIONAL	—	14 952	—	—	149	137	2	—
INTERREGIONAL	—	94 915	—	—	—	—	—	—
GLOBAL	—	100 219	—	—	—	—	—	—
OTHER[6]	—	5 152	1 100	436	110	212	434	13 258
INTERCOUNTRY SUB-TOTAL:	—	1 012 989	1 113	1 609	7 225	349	12 932	13 258
GRAND TOTAL	8 519 641	7 673 549	184 773	136 850	148 076*	166 038*	1 256 042	885 192

* Differs from preceding column because some experts served and some fellows studied in two or more countries.

1 EPTA 1965 figures not available; 1960-65 Special Fund figures not available.
2 Figures for Special Fund not available - 1959-65.
3 Specific countries not designated for Special Fund expenditure under $10,000, 1959-1970, which are included in Others; EPTA equipment expenditures not recorded prior to 1968.
4 Includes Middle East and parts of Europe.
5 Includes undistributed expenditures and inputs.

P O S T S C R I P T

A Citizen "Expert" Speaks to Parliament

Extract from testimony given in May 1985 by a former UNDP/UNESCO international expert to a parliamentary committee in his home country, a major donor to UNDP.

At the risk of sounding presumptuous, I believe it important to present to the panel a bit of information about myself. I represent no organization. I am simply a retired person who has come here at my own expense because I was invited and because I am an interested citizen.

My expertise for this panel lies not in the work at the front-office level but in the work at the field level. I worked for 12 years as a UNESCO Education Adviser in Africa, specifically in Nigeria and Sierra Leone — always working in small villages and always focussing on such critical development areas as community development, rural development and teacher education, and always on the delivery end of assistance packages. I was directly employed by UNESCO but the two major projects with which I was associated were under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). During the years these two projects had inputs and linkings with such other UN agencies as UNICEF, UNIDO, the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), and the Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for Women, along with such bilateral assistance organizations as Catholic Relief Service, U.S. Peace Corps, Canadian Universities Service Overseas, British Council and a German foundation. In brief, I have always worked with African and international colleagues on the receiving end of the pipeline and that is the end I know best.

I lived from 1971 to 1978 in a small Bendel State village in Nigeria, known as Abraka. Abraka was close to the oil fields and the Nigerian Government had requested UNDP, through its country programme, to establish a teacher training college there, mainly for the purpose of developing a cadre of science teachers. Nigeria, at that time, was trying to enter into the world of technology with its oil resources, but, interestingly enough, it found itself with a severe shortage of science teachers and, in many cases, a curriculum that did not include the science subjects.

All I can tell you is that in 1971 — under UNDP funding, UNESCO execution, a variety of UNICEF inputs ranging from science equipment to bedding for students, and material and professional resources committed by the Nigerian Government — we launched the Abraka College of Education for the State Ministry of Education with an enrollment of 48 students. When I left the project in 1978 to transfer to Sierra Leone, the College had an enrollment of 60 students and had produced graduates who were teaching science subjects in secondary schools all over Nigeria, trained and teaching a curriculum that had been developed by the staff of the College.

Acid test

I believe all of us are aware that the acid test for any development project is: "Can the institution carry on by itself once the agency assistance withdraws?"

In the case of the Abraka College of Education, which I visited in July 1984, it is now a full-blown academic institution, offering degrees in Education with an enrollment of 1,500 students and playing a key role in Nigeria's human resources development. Moreover, again with earlier assistance from UNDP, UNESCO and UNICEF, the College offers such operational auxiliary programmes as a

"We are convinced that the fundcmental problems of developing countries require a multisectoral approach based on a long-term planning horizon. This task can only be undertaken by a strong central funding agency which acts as an unbiased and impartial arbiter in dealing with conflicting sectoral claims and which is responding to the whole range of sectoral needs of a developing country as reflected in the country programme. The only organization capable of such an approach is UNDP. If it did not already exist, it would have to be invented."

Representative of Austria, 1983

science equipment repair service for schools, a science kit production centre for primary schools and a pre-science course for experienced teachers who have had no science background, but who wish to prepare themselves for admission into higher education courses.

In Sierra Leone, from 1978 through 1982, I was attached to a UNDP/UNESCO-supported project in the small village of Bunumbu in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone which is near the border of Liberia, and some 250 miles away from the capital city, Freetown. The project was known as "Training of Primary School Teachers for Rural Areas'. This was an experimental project with a development objective of using the vehicle of education to transform 20 rural villages into economically viable communities.

Again, the project was given technical assistance and programme execution by UNESCO, funded by UNDP, and monitored by both UNESCO and UNDP. It was also assisted with equipment from UNICEF for the primary schools. Co-operative village workshops and cottage industries were established in a linking arrangement with UNIDO and 20 model primary schools were built with the manpower help of the U.S. Catholic Relief Services, the U.S. Peace Corps and the U.K. Volunteer Service Organization, but with funds from UNCDF. This was a highly integrated project, linking education with community development, and was evaluated in several quarters as being a successful pilot scheme.

As in Nigeria, the international advisers departed with the end of the first phase in 1982. There are still some limited UNDP/UNESCO inputs, but I am proud to note that the institution is a viable one and carrying out its mission by itself. For example, if you were to visit the Bunumbu area today, you would find members of the staff conducting an interesting research study dealing with the effect of the project on the quality of life for village women and this study is being funded by the Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for Women.

In brief, ladies and gentlemen, I have personally seen progress in development activities take place. My experiences indicate to me that without the inputs, without the resources and without the guidance of the various agencies (at least the agencies with which I have had contact), I doubt if such advancement would have occurred.

"We want to strengthen the central role of UNDP for a more efficient management of UN system programmes whose dispersion sometimes concerns us... We know that the co-ordination and efficiency of our bilateral programmes depends, at headquarters and in the field, on the presence of a strong and coherent multilateral interlocutor. This is the significance of our increased contribution to UNDP."

Minister of Co-operation and Development France, 1982

From the standpoint of development, I found these agencies responsive to the local needs of the governments concerned. I found the concept of UN agencies co-ordinating their efforts through the local UNDP office to be a worthwhile one. I found that the monitoring and cost controls effected by UNDP over their projects were forthright and direct. Perhaps most of all, I found that the UN agencies are held in high esteem by the local villagers who were being served. In short, despite the usual problems, mistakes, constraints, and difficulties encountered in third world countries, my overall impression was one of effectiveness.

For the standpoint of a critical analysis and so as not to give the impression that every step along the way went smoothly and perfectly, I will address myself briefly to the problems, difficulties and frustrations that I just mentioned. The most serious frustrations were those of delays. Usually such delays were caused by two things — slow national and international communications and the fact that, oftimes, local UNDP offices were so understaffed that the personnel on hand were spread thin by the many hats they were expected to wear. The Sierra Leone UNDP office, for example, was a very busy one, dealing with agriculture, education, hydrological, institutional, commercial, mineral resource and other projects, all of which were overseen by three senior officers and about the same number of junior officers.

Tighter co-ordination

The most serious problems I observed during my field work were those caused by duplication of efforts, coupled with the need for tighter co-ordination. To explain further, I do recall that occasionally, some agencies or governments, in their desire to serve a need of a developing country, would come to that country to implement a project similar to one that was already under way or being prepared through the efforts of UNDP and/or one of the other UN agencies. I cannot account how such incidents happened except to believe that, perhaps, the government of the developing country had negotiated earlier with several agencies and then turned to the UN agency to settle for such assistance. I do know, however, whenever I personally observed such incidents of duplication, I would note my feelings, either formally or informally, to my authorities.

Fortunately, I was not alone and I do believe

"For the first time in history an initiative of almost universal scope was undertaken, financed by over 100 countries, for the purpose of defeating, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, the underdevelopment existing in a large part of the world. It was also the first massive contact of technicians and top officials of almost all countries. Never has this event been credited with its true political significance."

Hernan Santa Cruz, in Co-operate or Perish: The Dilemma of the World Community, *1984. (Chairman of the Second Committee of the General Assembly in 1949 when it endorsed the creation of the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance)*



that today there is a much greater awareness within the UN system, as well as on the part of governmental and non-governmental funding agencies, of this need for co-ordination and the need for project integration. I was pleased to note that during my last days in Sierra Leone, under the leadership of the local UNDP Resident Representative, regular meetings of UN agency project managers were called. Such meetings often led to the linking of development activities within the UN family. I can speak personally of how our UNESCO education project benefitted from such link-ups with UNIDO and UNICEF.

I should also mention that occasional meetings of directors of the funding agencies outside of the UN family and diplomatic corps' representatives were called by the UNDP Resident Representative for the purpose of getting the various donor agencies to co-ordinate their inputs. I have been led to believe that the concept of donors coming together to compare notes as a step towards co-ordination is becoming a UNDP standard operating procedure.

In the end, ladies and gentlemen, I am not sure how one measures the effectiveness of the development activities of UN agencies, or for that matter, any agency involved in aid assistance. The real effectiveness might not be evident until one or two generations from now. We are all aware that development is a slow, gradual and tedious process; it is inch by inch and step by step. All I know is that I saw teachers produced, curriculum reform instituted, cottage industries established, classroom instruction improved, agricultural outputs increased and needed human resources skills developed through the enthusiasm of local people and the input of the UN agencies.

As far as the farmer is concerned, if he can purchase a locally manufactured hoe or plow in his village, rather than an expensive one from overseas, he considers the assistance given to barrio technology as being effective. As far as the teacher is concerned, if there are maps, chalk and teaching guides in her classroom, she considers the external assistance effective. As far as the student is concerned, if he is better prepared for an occupation, is living better or has been helped to gain admission to a university as an agriculturist or an engineer or whatever, he will say that the assistance is effective. Since I am not a specialist in evaluation, maybe the best place to begin to determine effectiveness is with that farmer and teacher and student down there at that grassroots level.

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